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Abstract	  
Due to its reliance on the civil electrical grid, the Department of Defense has significant 
energy security vulnerabilities. DoD does not have energy production capabilities within 
its organization necessary to sustain the operations of a military installation. Its current 
installation energy strategy is a combination of energy reduction measures and 
renewable production efforts. Therefore, increased threats from cyber attacks combined 
with an aging electrical infrastructure threaten DoD’s energy supply to its installations.  
The electrical grid provides aggressors an opportune target for weakening military 
response capabilities in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. While DoD is 
successfully using energy more efficiently, it is failing produce power on the scale needed 
to secure its energy future. 
 
This paper examines the Department of Defense energy security strategy and identifies a 
sustainable solution using nuclear power.  The increased interest in Small Modular 
Reactor (SMR) Technology presents the Department of Defense with a power solution 
that is adaptable to military installation use.  This paper examines potential SMRs for 
commercialization and use on a military installation. It identifies what reactor 
characteristics are important to the Department of Defense and selects an SMR design to 
fit DoD’s energy needs. The paper then presents an implementation strategy taking into 
consideration the unique aspects of siting a small nuclear power facility on a military 
base. It presents financing options for the facility as well as addressing staffing and 
management considerations.   
 
Small modular nuclear reactor technology is ideally suited to fill the supply voids in 
DoD’s energy security portfolio.  Through the adoption of reactor technology, DoD not 
only secures its ability to respond to man-made and natural threats, but it also secures 
the future of the American people it protects.   
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Chapter	  1:	  	  Introduction	   	  
 
Over the last decade, the threats to national security underwent a dramatic transformation. 
In addition to threats from direct aggressors such as those faced at Pearl Harbor or during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, security professionals now face threats from a less overt enemy. 
A complicated network of loosely aligned, ideologically motivated activists, defines the 
threat environment today.  At times these individuals act solely in support of their cause.  
In other situations, ideologues are used as weapons in a larger, state supported form of 
21st century Cold War.  While the threat of conventional terrorist attacks, such as the 
events of 9/11 or the Boston Marathon Bombing (2013), are still real and present, a more 
insidious and pervasive threat targets the national infrastructure.  A new and dangerous 
weapon in the world of national security is the threat from cyber attacks.   
 
In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described 
structuring the United States Military in order to be prepared to respond to the 
complicated security environment of the 21st century. 
 
“We must prepare for a broad range of security challenges on the horizon-ranging from 
the military modernization programs of other countries to the non-state groups 
developing more cunning and destructive means to attack the United States and our allies 
and partners.”[1] 
 
State and non-state actors realize that Americans enjoy a sense of security stemming from 
its physical isolation.  America has clearly defined boarders and shares ideological ties 
with its neighbors to the North and South.  Oceans separate Americans from the upheaval 
felt in volatile nations of Southeast Asia and the constant geopolitical uncertainty in 
Western Europe. The American sense of security is misplaced.   The world is truly 
interconnected. Oceans or fences no longer deter the threats to America.  Terrorist groups 
travel easily across boarders or make attacks from remote locations with a computer and 
an Internet connection. Terrorists now target America by attacking its infrastructure 
networks. These attacks can be physical but more often are cyber based. Automation 
pervades society. The daily lives of Americans revolve around the use of technology for 
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even the most basic transactions. At the individual level, actions such as buying fuel for a 
car, picking up milk at the store or paying a mortgage payment are all done via digital 
transaction.  On a community level, daily operations are equally automated.  
Communities use automation to dispatch emergency services, warn residents of 
threatening weather conditions and maintain a constant electrical supply.  The increased 
automation in society promotes a feeling of security that stems from an expectation of 
quick and immediate reaction to problems of all kinds. However, Americans were 
stunned in 2013, when thousands fell victim to a cyber attack on the retail chain Target 
that resulted in loss of personal banking information. The size and scope of the attack 
were shocking, in part because Americans relied on a misplaced sense of security. 
 
As Secretary Gates noted, the Department of Defense is fully aware of the changing 
nature of the threat to national security. In an effort to combat this threat, DoD is moving 
aggressively to protect itself from cyber attacks.  In 2010, DoD established US Cyber 
Command (USCYBERCOM) to specifically combat these threats. DoD utilizes extensive 
security protocols for communication and information transfer.  It maintains and operates 
over 15,000 different computer networks across 4,000 military installations worldwide. 
Daily, DoD personnel use over seven million computers and telecommunications 
tools.[1]  
 
Yet at home, DoD still relies entirely on the civilian power grid to provide sustaining 
electricity to its computer networks.  Despite having an extensive network security 
system, any operation can be brought to complete stop by simple removing its power 
source.  Without electrical power movement orders, resupply requests and battlefield 
tracking all stop. The civilian power grid provides aggressors a way to directly influence 
the response capability of the US Military without directly attacking it.   
 
DoD defines threats to its energy supply as threats to its energy security.  Over the last 
decade, DoD has tied energy security and climate change together.  It sought solutions 
through a reduction and optimization of energy use.  It sought energy independence using 
renewable energy projects.  Each year, the Department of Defense directs billions of 
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dollars toward increasing its energy efficiency in order to establish a more robust energy 
security posture.   
The purpose of this paper is to propose a new approach to installation energy security 
using a nuclear small modular reactor (SMR) solution.  This paper first examines the 
current DoD energy security strategy with a focus on installation energy security.  It 
analyzes the combination of reduction initiatives and renewable production measures to 
determine if DoD is successfully securing its installation energy needs.  The paper reveals 
a significant gap between the reduced energy demanded by DoD and the power that is 
supplied by its renewable energy projects. To fill the energy demand gap, the paper 
proposes the use of a small modular nuclear reactor.  After a brief overview of SMR 
technology, the paper compares four proposed SMR designs and evaluates them for use 
on a military installation based on reactor characteristics.  It then proposes an 
implementation strategy detailing how to most effectively utilize SMR technology to 
meet the energy demands of a military installation.  The implementation strategy includes 
detailed siting considerations based impact to mission performance. A staffing solution is 
proposed that combines internal military nuclear specialists with external reactor 
operators.  Finally, a technology readiness assessment is used to identify the steps still 
required to implement a nuclear reactor energy security solution.   
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Chapter	  2:	  	  The	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Energy	  Demand	  
 
The mission of the Department of Defense is “to provide the military forces needed to 
deter war and to protect the security of our country.”[2] The structure required to support 
the mission is enormous. DoD employs over 2.1 million military and civilian personnel 
who operate from several hundred thousand buildings located at one of over 5000 
different locations. The total geographic footprint of DoD is over 30 million acres of 
land.[2] As such, DoD has at its command human and physical resources that rival all 
private sector organizations. DoD is one of the largest departments of the United States 
government.  Furthermore, the US spends more than any other nation-state on defense, 
committing 4.4% of its annual GDP on DoD.[3]  
 
In order to meets its mission, DoD works to efficiently allocate and properly locate of its 
resources to facilitate swift and effective responses to threats to national security. Doing 
so requires incredible amounts of energy.  In 2012, DOD spent a total of $20B on energy. 
DoD used the energy purchased for a wide range of applications from fueling vehicles to 
powering installations.  The majority of use was for powering tactical equipment in the 
form of operational energy.  Of the total energy consumed, 26% went toward use within 
buildings or installation power.[4]  
 
Installation energy is the power needed to maintain the base infrastructure.  Installation 
energy is primarily sourced from local commercial power distributors who sell to the 
DoD facility like any other customer.  Operational energy is used to project forces 
forward on the battlefield.  Operational energy comes in many forms. Petroleum is the 
largest form of operational energy used in DoD.  DoD uses petroleum fuels to fly aircraft, 
power boats, drive vehicles and run generators.  Other sources of operational energy 
include the nuclear power used on naval vessels and battery power for individual soldier 
equipment.   
Operational	  Energy	  
DoD is heavily dependent on petroleum as its main fuel source for operations. In 2011, 
DoD used 116.8 million barrels of fuel (mbbls) at a cost of $17.2B. In FY 13 DoD 
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budged $16.3B (104 mbbls) for fuel purchases.[5] DoD has long recognized over-
reliance on petroleum-based fuel products is a significant threat to operational force 
projection. DoD is actively seeking alternative fuel sources.  In FY13, DoD allocated 
$1.6B for operational energy initiatives, including research and development into 
alternative fuel sources for both Naval and Air Force equipment. The Navy is exploring 
options to replace diesel with biodiesel in its petroleum-powered vessels. The US Air 
Force is looking for alternative fuels for jets and cargo aircraft.  In the FY13 Operational 
Energy Budget Certification Report, Sharon Burke, the assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Operational Energy Plans and Programs, expressed significant concerns for all 
departments of the military and their lack of “systems and tools required to incorporate 
energy security considerations in to their requirements and acquisition processes” All 
three major components lacked the ability to forecast into their acquisition programs the 
requirements needed to meet energy security needs. [6] 
Installation	  Energy	  
DoD installation energy demand in FY2012 was 215 trillion BTU, which represents 
about 1% of the total US commercial sector energy consumption.[4] Unlike the 
operational energy needs, installation energy is used across the DoD vast physical 
footprint with the mission of sustaining, training, and equipping service members in 
preparation for their various military missions. DOD utilizes its installations in a variety 
of ways. 
 
• Training: One of the single most important functions of military installations is to 
provide service members a place to conduct training on their specific set of skills.   
Given that military service members use a skill set that is unique to their 
organizations, the Department of Defense must have specialized locations to 
conduct training. For example, large plots of secluded land are required to 
conduct training on weapons systems larger than small arms.  These types of 
systems include explosives, missiles, radar systems and many other large-scale 
weapons.  DOD establishes a geographic footprint that allows its employees to 
train on the use of these weapons while keeping the civilian population safe from 
their effects.   
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• Operations: The operational infrastructure of DoD is vast.  Traditional operational 
units such as Army brigades or Air Force Squadrons require a footprint from 
which to plan their training, manage their people and prepare for deployed 
operations.  Command and control centers exist throughout the military providing 
continuous oversight of and communications capabilities for forces deployed and 
abroad.  The command and control infrastructure of DoD requires continuous 
power supplies and communications channels to monitor operations worldwide 
and to be prepared to respond to national security threats.  
 
• Sustaining:  There are two major components to sustaining DoD forces; 
Equipment Sustainment and Manpower Sustainment 
 
o Equipment sustainment.  This includes scheduled services and 
maintenance as well as unscheduled repairs.  The specialized equipment 
within DoD requires specialized facilities to conduct maintenance on 
equipment.  The spectrum of equipment in need of maintenance is broad 
ranging from a Nimitz class aircraft carrier to an F18 fighter to an M4 
Carbine rifle.  All of these items require continuous support and 
maintenance to stay operational and DoD must have the infrastructure 
network to support that maintenance.  
 
o Manpower Sustainment.  Sustaining the employees of DoD includes a 
variety of infrastructure demands.  Many service members and their 
families live on military installations.  Housing for these individuals 
includes single-family homes, duplexes and barracks for single soldiers.  
In addition, the military has temporary housing for service members 
conducting training away from their home installations.  To support the 
military manpower, there are extensive health and dental facilities as well 
as educational resources for employees and their families.   
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• Projection:  DoD meets national security threats outside the contiguous United 
States by projecting forces onto the battlefield.  It does this primarily through sea 
and air projection as a first step and then land projection.  Moving forces from 
stateside operations via land or air requires projection platforms be situated and 
postured for movement.  Infrastructure that supports these types of movements is 
naval stations and air bases. These facilities are geographic cache of logistical 
supplies needed to move operational units forward from the United States to face 
threats in other places.   
 
In 2012, DoD spent $3.8B on electrical power, heat and cooling for facilities.  DoD 
consumed 215,100 BBtu (billion British thermal units) of energy requiring approximately 
7 GW of power production.1  The largest consumer of facility energy within DoD is the 
Army, which accounts for 37% of the total facility energy consumed.[4]  
 
 
Figure 1: DoD Facility Energy Consumption and Cost[4] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1The energy to power conversion rate is based on a 24-hour day, 365-day year and a production capacity of 
90%. The conversion rate is consistent throughout the entirety of the analysis in this document.  
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80% of the facility energy consumed by DoD goes toward natural gas and electricity.  
This is primarily used for power, climate control and water heating. 
 
 
Figure 2: DoD Facility Energy Consumption by Type[4] 
 
When looking across the spectrum of DoD fixed installations, there is a wide range in the 
amount of energy demanded.  The demand is primarily influenced by the size of each 
installation, the environmental conditions surrounding the installation, its departmental 
mission and the square footage of buildings requiring energy.  Thus DoD categorizes its 
energy usage using energy intensity.  Energy intensity is measured in billion British 
thermal units per gross square foot of facility space (BBtu/Gsf).  In an effort to identify 
the most energy consuming facilities, DoD began an aggressive campaign in FY2010 to 
monitor and track energy consumption at the installation level rather than as an aggregate 
whole.  By measuring energy consumption at the installation level, DoD gained a more 
specific understanding of its energy uses and needs. For example, a small Naval Air 
Station in the Florida Keys will have a different energy consumption profile than a 
garrison army base in Fort Wainwright, Alaska.  A large Air Force basic training facility 
in Texas will consume energy differently than Twenty Nine Palms, a remote weapons 
testing facility in the California desert.  This data allowed planners to develop targeted 
energy reduction plans for each facility based on consumption, number of facilities, 
mission and the environment.[7]  
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Chapter	  3:	  	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Energy	  Strategy	  
 
“Sustainability is not an individual Departmental program; rather it is an organizing 
paradigm that applies to all DoD mission and program areas”[8] 
 
The Department of Defense outlines its strategic goals as an organization in the 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report.  The latest report was published in February 2010 
(QDR 10).  In that report, DoD specifically addresses energy security as “having assured 
access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient 
energy to meet operational needs.” [1] Further, DoD links, climate change and energy 
security. It devotes considerable effort to increasing its energy security by reducing its 
environmental impact. Infrastructure (installation) and operational energy efficiency 
programs are foremost in DoD’s energy security strategies including alternative fuel 
sources, less pollutant fuel sources and the identification of new fuel-free technology.  
Domestically, DoD is looking to balance energy usage and production through reduction 
efforts as well as production initiatives. These efforts must be conducted without 
sacrificing the mission capabilities of an installation. [1] 
Energy	  Security	  Defined	  
 
Energy security for the Department of Defense means always having an available supply 
of energy to conduct operations. Without power to conduct operations, the Department of 
Defense assets are useless. Energy is needed to maneuver, command and communicate 
and is essential to every element of every military operation. The energy itself is derived 
from many sources such as petroleum to power vehicles, aircraft and generators. It can 
also come from local commercial providers in the form of grid electricity and natural gas.  
 
One of the largest threats to energy security for DoD is its dependence on fossil fuels, 
particularly in operations. In the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, fuel 
convoys were essential to support operations and fuel trucks were literally everywhere. 
Attacks on these convoys caused significant delays and disruptions of the operational 
fighting capabilities of forces on the ground. [8] In addition, simply acquiring and 
moving the petroleum to the necessary general location is often challenging as worldwide 
petroleum distribution networks are at increased risk for attack.  Shipping lanes 
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transporting bulk oil to refineries face disruptions at choke points such as Strait of 
Hormuz and Straits of Malacca.  Pirates, regional political instability and military actions 
all threaten shipments of petroleum worldwide.  Such instability can lead to drastic price 
fluctuations in the cost of oil.  To counter instability in the petroleum market, DoD has 
chosen to acquire and store vast amounts of petroleum reserves.[8] 
 
Energy vulnerabilities also exist within the U.S.  Most electrical power and natural gas 
for fixed installations in the U.S. is sourced from local commercial suppliers. As Dr. 
Dorothy Robyn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment 
acknowledges: 
 
“Facilities energy is critical to mission assurance. Our fixed installations support 
combat operations more directly than ever before, and the serve as staging 
platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations 
are largely dependent on commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption 
due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events and a potential kinetic or 
cyber attack.”[8] 
 
Military installations at home provide not just housing for service members and storage 
for equipment. They provide key strategic staging locations for military force projection 
operations in the form of railheads and runways.  Installations are an essential network of 
communications, command and control centers providing real time monitoring of defense 
operations worldwide.  Installations are staging locations for disaster relief efforts 
following local natural disasters such as Hurricane Sandy and Hurricane Katrina.  Yet 
these facilities are all vulnerable because they depend almost entirely on external sources 
of energy.  In the event of a natural disaster or even just a simple outage, military 
installations must wait, like any other customer, for the utility to restore power. Some 
critical systems have backup generators that provide short-term power in these situations. 
These generators are limited in number and cannot be expected to run for extended 
operations.   
 
It is important to note that physical threats to the electrical grid impact not only DoD 
installations but the general public as well. For example, an April 2013, an attack on a 
California power transmission substation highlighted the vulnerabilities of America’s 
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power gird.  During the 19-minute attack, assailants fired bullets into transformers that 
supplied power into Silicon Valley.  The electric company was able to reroute power to 
prevent a blackout however the repairs to the substation took 27 days.  Even more 
alarming was the relative ease with which the attackers executed the assault.  The 
weapons used were not sophisticated.  They faced no resistance or security at the 
substation.  The assistants were able to methodically execute their attack exactly as 
planned with no interference from either the power company or local police agency.  
Across America, the electrical grid is no different from this California transmission 
station.  Should America’s enemies seek to cripple the military infrastructure, the power 
network used to sustain an installation is an excellent domestic terrorism target. [9] 
 
Additionally, there are ever increasing concerns about the potential for a cyber attack on 
our nations electrical grid. A recent article by Dan Weissman of NPR describes an 
electrical grid security exercise conducted by North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) called Grid Ex 2013 that took place in November of 2013.  More 
than 2000 utilities workers, regulators and law enforcement officials participated in the 
exercise.  While the results of this exercise have not yet been published, it is important to 
note that American utility companies are taking the treat of cyber security and kinetic 
attacks to the grid very seriously.  Exercises such as this help to bring to light the true 
nature of our society in the event of a prolonged power outage.[10] In the event of a 
cyber or kinetic attack on the nations electrical grid, the military would be called upon to 
exercise its homeland defense mission and act as a staging location for relief and repair 
efforts. Unfortunately, due to its own dependence on commercial power, it is likely that 
military forces will be just as helpless as the average citizen in such a crisis.   
Operational	  Energy	  Strategy	  
The three key operational energy goals of DoD were outlined in the May 2011 
Operational Energy Strategy. [11] 
 
1. More Fight, Less Fuel: Reduce the demand for energy in military 
operations 
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2. More options, less risk: Expand and secure the supply of energy to 
military operations.  
3. More capability, less cost: Build energy security into the future force. 
 
The total budget for operational energy from FY13-17 included $9.0B for operational 
energy programs outside the purchase of bulk fuel.   Of the $9.0B, 92% of the budget is 
directed toward research, development, testing and procurement in support of energy 
initiatives. 90% of the energy initiatives are specifically focused on demand reduction 
solutions.  This results in $8.1B between FY2013 to 2017 being used to find technology 
to help reduce demand.[6]  
 
However, $8.1B represents a fraction of the money projected to be spent on bulk fuel 
purchases.  Using the fuel purchase projections from FY2013 OE Budget Cert Report and 
accounting for an estimated reduction in use of 5%, the total number of barrels of fuel 
purchased between FY13-FY17 will be 384.8 mbbls at a cost of $56.7B ($3.51 a gallon).2 
DoD acknowledges the enormity of the energy resources: 
“Our [energy] posture is imposing costs at all levels, strategic, operational, 
tactical and financial.”   S. Burke, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Operational Energy Plans and Programs [8] 
 
The force projection capabilities of the US Military rely almost entirely on the use 
petroleum based fuel products. A significant technological shift is required to find 
alternative fuel sources for equipment such as helicopter’s, aircraft and tanks which rely 
heavy on combustion of petroleum fuel for power. In the 1950s, the Navy made a 
technological leap forward in reducing fuel costs by switching to a nuclear powered 
vessel.  Possible alternatives being explored are hydrogen-powered vehicles and battery-
powered vehicles.  The Department must be careful when looking at alternatives that it 
does not sacrifice its force projection capabilities in the name of energy efficiency.  
Petroleum is a reliable, portable and powerful source of fuel. Yet it is also limiting in that 
it is expended quickly and requires an extensive supply chain.  However, until technology 
                                                
2 5% was chosen for a percentage reduction based on a projection report from the FY12 Operational 
Energy Annual Report. This report predicted a reduction of 5% from year FY13-14.  I applied this 
reduction annually.  The projection is purely an approximation.  Factors such as the price of oil, the nature 
of military conflicts abroad and actually effectiveness of demand reduction initiatives will all impact usage.   
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evolves to replace petroleum, the Department of Defense looks to simply build 
efficiencies into the current combustion technologies.  While this efficiency will reduce 
the amount of operational energy used, there will not be significant reductions unless the 
base use of combustion power is changed.   
Installation	  Energy	  Strategy	  
 
In an effort to reduce its vulnerability to energy supply disruptions, DoD is focusing on 
reducing its energy consumption through conservation and improved efficiency.  More 
than $1.1B has been budgeted for energy conservation improvements to buildings.  
Upgrades to facilities include measures such as replacing windows, updating HVAC 
systems and improving lighting.  
 
Additionally, DoD is looking at ways to produce its own energy on-site.  On-site energy 
production is a key element in reducing the energy security vulnerabilities within DoD in 
the event of a commercial grid collapse or outage. Recognizing that energy independence 
is critical to ensure operational security, DoD is analyzing the feasibilities of various 
renewable energy sources coupled with the use of  “micro-grid technology” to control 
and store on-site energy.[8] 
Energy	  Laws	  and	  Regulations	  
 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 sets goals for annual energy consumption guidelines, 
which increase the usage of renewable energy sources for all federal facilities and 
agencies.  Table 1 shows the required amount of energy consumed by federal agencies to 
come from renewable sources. 
 
Table 1: Energy Policy Act of 2005 Renewable Energy Goals 
Year	   Percent	  Consumption	  from	  
Renewables	  FY07-­‐09	   3%	  FY10-­‐12	   5%	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Additionally, the Energy Independence and Security act of 2007 (EISA 2007) and 
Executive Order 13423 (Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy and 
Transportation Management) combine to set further goals for federal agency 
consumption resulting in a 30% decrease by 2015 and an increase in renewable energy 
source consumption of 7.5% by FY2013. The regulations outline practices to enhance 
energy conservation and require the complete metering of all federal facilities for natural 
gas and electricity by given target years. Further, all new buildings must be constructed in 
accordance with energy efficient standards and equipment purchased for federal buildings 
to be energy efficient.  Finally, by 2025, Federal regulations (10 U.S.C§2911e) requires 
25% procurement of energy from renewable sources.[7] 
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Chapter	  4:	  	  Energy	  Security	  Programs	  
Net	  Zero:	  Background	  
DoD is not conducting its research and implementing its energy programs in isolation. As 
early as 2006, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), working with the 
Department of Energy, began using the term Net Zero to describe buildings and building 
construction that met certain characteristics related to cost effective, reduced energy use 
(NZEB). [12] According to the NREL, 40% of the primary energy used in the United 
States goes to commercial and residential buildings. 70% of the electricity used goes to 
these buildings.  Due to increasing technological demands, the demand for electricity is 
only expected to rise in the future years. Figure 3 shows NREL’s estimate for the project 
grown in building energy consumption by sector.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Projected Growth in building energy use relative to other sector[12]  
 
Nested under the concept of reducing the negative impact of energy production, the 
NREL sought to find ways to reduce building energy consumption by promoting NZEBs.  
NZEBs are buildings that significantly reduce their energy consumption needs through 
technologically efficient upgrades, behavior modification and the use of renewable 
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energy.  Significant effort went into actually defining and categorizing the energy use of 
a building as well as working to reduce consumption through efficiencies. To reach Net 
Zero, companies are encouraged to first focus on demand reduction because this is most 
cost effective.  Only once demand has been appreciably reduced does the company began 
pursuing renewable energy supply options. [12]  
 
NREL’s study, Lessons learned from Case Studies of Six High-Performance buildings, 
discussed the efforts to take six commercial buildings and make them NZEB. [13] The 
results were mixed. The study demonstrated that while technology can reduce energy 
costs, achieving Net Zero is very difficult. All six buildings used more energy than 
anticipated and produced less than anticipated.  Failure to reduce energy usage was 
attributed to a number of factors including an overly optimistic projection about the 
ability to modify energy usage behavior of individuals.  Additionally, some concepts such 
as day lighting failed to provide adequate lighting causing an increase beyond prediction 
of electrical lighting.  Energy usage from plug loading was higher than forecast.  There 
was also failure on the supply side of the model. Photovoltaic (PV) energy production 
was less than models forecast. Overall the study learned that there is no single solution to 
making a building reach Net Zero energy balance and it takes a whole building approach 
to solve the problem. [13]  
The	  Army	  Net	  Zero	  Program	  
 
Since DoD is the largest energy consumer in the US government, [14] it and DoE began a 
joint initiative in 2008 to study the energy use of the military and identify methods for 
reducing demand and increasing use of renewable energy.  The NREL conducted the 
study and used Marine Corps Air Station Miramar as its prototype installation.  Based on 
that study, the NREL issued Net Zero Energy Military Installations: A Guide to 
Assessment and Planning as a guide for the implementation of an energy conservation 
strategy for a military installation.   
 
A key factor to strategy development is recognizing some of the unique constraints of a 
military installation. A primary consideration is project and mission compatibility.  Under 
no circumstances can an energy reduction project hinder the accomplishment of a 
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military mission.  Thus special understanding of military operations is necessary in order 
to find the right solution for each installation.  For example, at an installation with high 
levels of fixed or rotary wing aircraft traffic, one would not want to provide additional 
energy via wind turbine power as these devices present obstacles to air movement.  The 
impact on the security of the installation is another key factor.  Ideally the power 
generation source would be located on the installation premises. This increases 
installation security as the logistics support for the power facility is contained within the 
parameters of the installation.  An off-site power source forces the installation to be 
dependent on either a commercial electrical grid or constant supply lines such as fuel 
tankers.  Installation environment will also play a role site selection and strategy.  
Military installations exist in a wide variety of climates so there is no single solution for 
all installations.  Additional considerations include economic factors such as life cycle 
costs, storage costs and technology maturity. [14]  
 
In 2011 the Army initiated its Net Zero Pilot program on 17 installations. Under this 
program, selected installations were provided assistance in achieving Net Zero in energy, 
water, waste or a combination of the three. In this paper, the focus will be on the Net 
Zero Energy programs rather than waste or water program.  Figure 4 shows the locations 
of these installations and their Net Zero program 
   
 
Figure 4: Army Net Zero Pilot Installations[15]  
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The Army Net Zero Energy goal is for an installation to produce as much energy as it 
uses.   Within its pilot installations, the Army has made considerable effort to reduce 
energy demand.  NREL theorizes that the most economic way to reach Net Zero energy is 
to reduce energy demand. Behavior modification accomplishes demand reduction without 
the need of capital expenditures and the use of energy efficient technology. [14] NREL 
calls upon installation leaders to find “opportunities for procedural, behavioral, process 
and operational energy saving actions (relying) on engaging the attention and creativity 
of personnel.” [14]  
 
 
Figure 5: Net Zero Energy Hierarchy 
The Army has taken this suggestion as its first and primary step to reaching a Net Zero 
energy security solution. Figure 5 illustrates the Net Zero Hierarchy. [14] The Energy 
Engineering Analysis Program conducted energy surveys of the pilot installations to 
determine baseline energy needs and identify inefficiencies in energy usage. [14]  
 
Energy surveys led to the development of the Army Meter Data Management System, 
which monitors installation energy usage at the individual building level and helps 
installation, appointed energy managers find solutions to energy waste at their location. 
The Army also built a robust staff of energy managers who monitor energy usage at each 
installation and provide reporting through the Army Energy and Water Reporting System.  
New buildings are required to following construction guidance with the aims of making 
them as energy efficient as possible.  An award and recognition system was developed to 
recognize installation leaders who were innovators in energy reduction.  These are all 
examples of procedural and policy measures aimed at simply reducing consumption. [16]  
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Additional energy reduction measures under Net Zero include building modernization 
projects. Improvements to HVAC systems, lighting systems, use of LED lights and 
improved control systems all helped reduce energy waste on military installations. Bases 
use thermal imaging technology to develop a building thermal envelope and find where 
buildings lack insulation. Energy managers improve control systems to allow for a more 
efficient use of building systems such as precooling buildings, automating lighting 
operations and optimizing the use of fans and blowers. [15] Many of these projects are 
paid for with all up front capital cost deferred from the military using unique financing 
options.  One finance option is a utility energy service contracts (UESC) where a utility 
pays for the upfront capital costs of the project and is then repaid by the energy savings 
generated by the improvements.  Energy saving performance contracts (EPSC) are 
arrangements between the Army and an energy service company where the company 
analyzes, develops, funds and manages energy savings projects and is repaid by the 
energy saved. [15]  
 
The Army is aggressively pursuing a number of micro power renewable energy projects 
on its pilot installations.  Most projects are solar photovoltaic projects producing between 
anywhere between 0.10 to 10 MW of energy.  Most projects are small in scale and used 
to power outdoor lighting or heat water.  Some projects use installation waste to produce 
energy to augment the base.  The most successful installation is Fort Carson, which gets 
3.5% of its total energy from renewable sources. [15]  
Department	  of	  the	  Navy:	  Large	  Scale	  Renewable	  Projects	  
 
The Navy’s renewable energy program results in the production of 20% of the Navy’s 
electricity being produced from renewable sources, the majority from two large-scale 
projects: a 270 MW geothermal station at China Lake, CA and the Norfolk Naval 
Shipyard solid waste project in Portsmouth VA.  
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Figure 6: Geothermal Plant at China Lake, CA[4] 
 
 The China Lake Project produces 77% of the Navy’s total renewable energy and the 
NNSY solid waste plant produces 20%.  At both facilities, the electricity produced is sold 
to the local utility and not used by the installation. Because it is not consumed by the 
installation, it is not counted toward the EPA 2005 act goal of consuming 7% of all 
electricity from renewable sources by 2013. [7]   
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Chapter	  5:	  	  Energy	  Security	  Program	  Analysis	  
 
In addition to analyzing energy security in terms of reducing greenhouse gases and 
conservation, an assessment of security of supply and reliability of supply of energy is 
also necessary. To achieve energy security, DoD key infrastructure must have a constant 
supply of energy regardless of the source or the situational environment. This section 
provides an analysis of energy source and reliability of energy source in order to frame 
the effectiveness of DoD’s various energy programs in terms of energy security.  
 
1. Will DoD meet its regulatory and legal energy efficiency requirements? 
2. How effective are the energy reduction measures at optimizing the energy 
need by DoD to operate?  
3. How effective are the renewable energy measures at producing a reliable 
source of power that meets the operational needs of an installation?  
1.	  Will	  DoD	  meet	  its	  regulatory	  and	  legal	  energy	  security	  requirements?	  
 
DoD established a timeline to meet its legally mandated energy security targets.  This is 
the most basic metric of program evaluation in that it is a known and established metric 
for DoD to meet. Table 2 illustrates DoD’s internal analysis on its progress towards 
meeting its energy security goals. [4] 
Table 2: FY 2012 Progress Report 
Goals	  and	  
Objective	  
Metric	   DoD	  FY12	  
Performance	  
Target	  	  	   Evaluation	  Reduction	  in	  Facility	  energy	  intensity	  (EISA	  2007)	  
BTU/gross	  square	  foot	   -­‐17.7%	   -­‐21.0%	   Fail	  
Increase	  Renewable	  Energy	  Consumption	  (EPA	  2005)	  
Renewable	  energy	  consumption	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  facility	  energy	  consumed	  
4.0%	   5%	   Fail	  
Increase	  Renewable	  Production	  (US	  Reg)	   Renewable	  Energy	  produced	  and	  procured	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  facility	  energy	  consumed	  
9.6%	   25%	  by	  2025	   Failed	  to	  
meet	  
target	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Table 2 illustrates the DoD is not on track to meet any of its energy security goals. It is 
not in compliance with US law and regulation.  The most significant failure is its goal to 
increase renewable energy production to 25% by 2025. Currently DoD is well below its 
target metric to be on track to meet that goal.  Without a significant change in its 
renewable energy production category it will not meet the goal.   
2.	  How	  effective	  are	  the	  energy	  reduction	  measures	  at	  optimizing	  the	  energy	  need	  by	  
DoD	  to	  operate?	  	  
 
There are two variables in evaluating this metric; optimal energy consumption and cost of 
optimization. The first is the effectiveness of the energy reduction measures to reach 
optimal consumption levels. In order to achieve energy security, DoD needs to be using 
its energy in the most efficient ways.  Figure 7 shows that 91% of DoD’s energy project 
appropriations are aimed at reducing energy use.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: FY12 Energy Project Appropriations[4]  
 
 
Internal analysis from the Department shows that it does not forecast meeting this 
requirement.  DoD argues a more realistic goal would have allowed for smaller target 
percentages earlier on in the program to allow for time for funding, design and 
implementation of energy efficiency projects. It expects to meet the 30% goal by 2020 
instead of 2015.[8] 
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Figure 8 shows DoD’s progress in reducing its energy intensity footprint in order to meet 
the goals outlined in EISA 2007. Currently DoD must reduce energy intensity at a rate of 
3% per year in order to meet the goal 30% reduction by 2015.   
 
 
Figure 8 Progress Toward Facility Energy Intensity Reduction Goals[8] 
 
While the Department has failed to meet the targeted reduction goals necessary to meet 
its targeted 30% reduction goal, it has been successful in reducing its installation energy 
use.  It has instituted a robust system of procedural and technical tools to monitor 
consumption. EISA 2007 mandates a 30% reduction. This level of consumption might 
not be the optimal level of consumption for an origination as large and diverse as the 
Department of Defense.  It has a unique mission and utilizes one of kind equipment in its 
day-to-day operations.  It operates in a wide variety of physical environments.  
Understanding its constraints and having accurate systems to measure consumption will 
allow DoD to establish its own estimate for optimal consumption levels.  Further analysis 
is needed to determine the optimal level of energy consumption for DoD that may differ 
from the mandated 30% reduction.  Despite not meeting its goals, the Department has 
been effective at curbing energy use.   
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The second measure of the energy reduction programs is cost versus return on 
optimization. However, this measure is difficult to quantify. By using an energy 
performance savings contracts (EPSC) or utility energy service contracts (UESC) much 
of the up front cost is assumed by a contractor or utility.  EPSC and UESC pass the cost 
of the project to the contractor or utility that is then repaid by the energy savings 
produced.  DoD’s costs relating to these projects are deferred yet they are very real.  
While DoD has little to no upfront expense, it also does not recognize any gain until the 
contractor or utility has recouped its costs.  An installation experiencing a demand 
reduction will pay a reduced power bill.  The difference however, between the reduced 
bill and the old bill, is paid to the contractor. Thus, DoD does not actually recognize any 
savings until the contract is completely recouped, which could be years or even decades 
later. During that time, many systems will require routine repair and upgrades; those 
costs are passed on to DoD, but again, any benefits are not recognized until much later. 
 
In order to accurately analyze the cost effectiveness of energy reduction measures, all it is 
useful to assume to be incurred by DoD regardless if they are a direct procurement or on  
a delayed UESC/EPSC payment plan. Figure 9 illustrates the annual expense of energy 
efficiency investments (direct, EPSC, UESC) verse the annual energy savings from the 
projects FY2007 through FY2011.3  Energy savings estimates came from either actual 
savings, in BBtu, or those projected by the contract if actual savings was not reported.  
Using the average cost for a BTU of energy during the specified fiscal year was to 
calculate the total savings from the energy efficiency projects.  
 
Figure 9 contrasts the expense with the anticipated annual return from the projects.  
Expenses include the amount of money either directly appropriated or awarded through 
UESC and EPSC during each fiscal year to energy reduction measures.  Returns are 
based on the anticipated savings (in Bbtu) estimated by the contractor.4 Assuming that the 
savings realized from the project meet the anticipated goals, Figure 9 illustrates how long 
it will take each year’s group of projects to pay for themselves.  Amortization of the 
                                                
3 The data for figures 9 and 10 are from the Annual Energy Management Reports FY2007 to FY2011. 
4 Conversion of returns from Bbtu to dollars was done using DoD’s average price per Btu for the given 
fiscal year.  
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project cannot be done without knowing their expected life cycle. Thus, returns on a 
project in the form of reduced energy cost will only be recognized once it has paid its 
capital costs.   
 
Figure 9: DoD Energy Efficiency Projects 
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Figure 10 looks only at energy efficiency projects started in FY2007 to FY2011. It 
contrasts the debt DoD assumes against the projects with the anticipated returns. It 
assume energy savings returns consistent with the estimate provided by the contractor, 
Figure 10 approximates that projects started between FY2007 and FY2011 will have fully 
repaid their capital cost by FY2021.    This simple analysis does not include additional 
costs incurred for maintenance and repair of the newly installed systems. It also does not 
include the impact on both cost and returns of projects that could be started after FY2011. 
It does not include changes in return based on drastic changes in the price of energy.    
 
 
Figure 10: Optimal Repayment Schedule For Efficiency Projects  
 
Figure 10 shows the large upfront costs of programs and the lengthy “payback” or 
“benefit” period.  The benefit period is the number of years required for a project to “pay 
for itself” and DoD to recoup the upfront investment. Recoupment timelines are based on 
the extremely generous assumption that efficiency projects will return savings as 
intended. As the NREL studies noted, however, many efficiency procedures do not result 
the predicted levels of reduction. Individual behavior is extremely hard to modify. Energy 
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audits of buildings might not accurately capture building energy usage or as building 
purposes change, energy usage will change.   Additionally, deviations in standard 
weather patterns and changes to the price of commercial energy will affect returns on the 
investments.   Finally, expenditures for maintenance and repair of new technologies are 
not captured in the initial cost estimates.  Therefore, one might conclude that Figure 10 
represents an optimally or “best case” recoupment schedule. 
3.	  	  How	  effective	  are	  the	  renewable	  energy	  measures	  at	  producing	  a	  reliable	  source	  of	  
power	  that	  meets	  the	  operational	  needs	  of	  an	  installation?	  	  
 
Understanding the value of DoD’s renewable energy measures requires an understanding 
of the distribution of DoD’s renewable energy sources and the metrics being used to 
measure success.  According to regulations, DoD will be required to produce 25% of its 
energy from renewable sources by 2025. At the present time, however, the energy 
produced from DoD’s two largest renewable energy projects (China Lake Thermal Plant 
and Norfolk Naval Shipyard Waste Facility) is not yet directly used by DoD but is 
instead sold to local utilities. As a result, DoD is self-generating only a very small portion 
of its own energy.  As illustrated in Table 3, many of the renewable energy projects 
produce small amounts of power. The first half of the table shows the total number of 
renewable energy projects in DoD as well as the total number producing less than 100 
BBtu/year (4 MW).  The second half of the table shows how much energy these projects 
produce in terms of percentage of DoD consumption.5 
 
Table 3: DoD Energy Production as a Percentage of Consumption 
 
                                                
5 The energy to power conversion rate is based on a 24-hour day, 365-day year and a production capacity of 
90%.  
Fiscal'Year 2011 2012
Number'of'Renewable'
Energy'Projects 476 679
Small'Production'
Projects'(<100'Bbtu/yr) 461 454
China'Lake/Norfolk 2.53% 2.61%
All'other'Projects 0.96% 1.37%
Total 3.49% 3.99%
Energy'Produced'as'a'Percentage'of'DoD'Total'Annual'
Energy'Consumption
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As Table 3 further illustrates, the vast majority of DoD renewable energy projects are 
small and produce less than 100 Bbtu annually.  Of the 454 small projects (producing less 
than 100 BBtu/year) in 2012, 91.9% produce less than 5 BBtu/year (0.19 MW).  Most 
provide power to very small, ancillary pieces of equipment and thus do little, if anything 
to improve energy security.  Major communication nodes, intelligence hubs, troop 
staging locations and operational installations still draw almost all of their power from 
conventional sources. Renewable sources are used sparsely to power a few outdoor lights 
or perhaps heat a single building.   
 
Table 4 is a list of major installations and an analysis of their energy demands from FY 
2012.  The chart illustrates that most key operational installations could be fully powered 
by a facility the size of the China Lake thermal plant, which produced over 3600 Bbtu of 
energy in FY 2012.  Conversely, if one uses the power from all 454 small energy projects 
in DoD (each producing less than 100 Bbtu/yr), the total energy produced in one year 
would be 1147 Bbtu.  The combined output of all the small energy projects fail to meet 
the energy demands of most DoD installations.   
 
Table 4: Installation Energy Demand Analysis 
 
 
If DoD is to achieve energy security, it must produce energy on a scale that is usable. In 
an energy security crisis such as a grid collapse, a natural disaster or a cyber attack, DoD 
would depend on self-generated power.  In the event of a crisis, DoD installations could 
China&Lake&
(3671&Bbtu)
454&Small&
Projects&
(1147&Bbtu)
Emergency&
Energy&
(Bbtu)
Energy&
Source&<&
100&Bbtu
Fort%Bragg,%NC 3491 Y N 873 N
Fort%Campbell,%KY 1578 Y N 395 N
Ft%Wainwright 3006 Y N 752 N
Pearl%Harbor,%HI 846 Y Y 212 N
Naval%Station%Norfolk 2032 Y N 508 N
Florida%Keys%Air%Station% 199 Y Y 50 Y
Twenty%Nine%Palms,%CA% 871 Y Y 218 N
Lackland%AFB,%TX% 1994 Y N 499 N
Peterson%AFB,%CO 2188 Y N 547 N
NSA,%Various%Locations 3042 Y N 761 N
Emergency&Energy&
Viability&(25%)FY12&Energy&
Consumption&
(Bbtu)
Installation,&Location
Primary&Energy&Source&
Viability
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limit what facilities receive power and which do not.  Table 4 shows the installation 
requirements for an emergency energy level set at 25% of normal demand. Assuming an 
emergency energy level of 25% consumption, military installations will need a reliable 
power source greater than 100 Bbtu/year.  Most of DoD’s renewable energy projects 
produce less than 100 BBtu per year and 91% of these projects actually produce less than 
5 Bbtu in a year.  The current size and scale of DoD’s renewable energy project fails to 
provide an installation energy security in emergency situations.   
Energy	  Security:	  A	  Problem	  Unchanged	  
DoD will continue it efforts to reduce energy consumption and find optimal consumption 
levels..  The focus of these efforts is continued improvements to existing buildings and 
building energy efficiency into new buildings. As the Defense Department restructures its 
force, however, consumption needs will change.  A periodic assessment of power 
demands and reevaluation of the 30% target goal will better aid in finding the optimal 
energy demand level for the department.  
 
However, reduction in energy usage alone will not provide protection against energy 
attacks.  To be secure and remain mission capable in a time of threat to national security, 
the Department of Defense must have an independent, reliable source of power.  In 
FY2012, DoD conducted an analysis of utility outages across its installations and found 
87 outages that each lasted longer than 8 hours. Figure 11 shows a breakdown of these 
outages and their financial impact. The largest contributor to significant loss of power to 
an installation is acts of nature. [4]  
 
 
Figure 11: FY2012 Utility Outages Lasting Longer Than 8 Hours[4] 
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Figure 11 focuses on outages lasting longer than eight hours. However, eight hours, in a 
time of crisis, is an eternity.  For example, the time from when United Airlines Flight 175 
crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center to the time the building collapsed 
was fifty-six minutes. Thirty minutes later the north tower collapsed.[21] During that 
time, every person in America and many millions across the world watch their televisions 
anxiously.  New York’s first responders moved immediately, many to their own peril, to 
respond to the incident.  Imagine if the response had been delayed 8 hours.  
 
Figure 12 illustrates DoD’s use of renewable energy as a percentage of total electrical 
energy consumption.  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Use of Renewable Energy as a Percentage of Electricity Use[8] 
 
Not only is the overall percentage of renewable energy sourcing small, the majority of all 
renewable energy is produced at only two locations. Further, 61% of its renewable energy 
projects for FY2012 produced less than 5 BBtu/yr (0.19 MW).  Given that the average 
residential house in the United States has an annual energy rate of 0.0013 MW, a single 5 
BBtu/yr project can power about 143 homes.[22] Clearly, such projects are ineffective in 
improving energy security.  Nonetheless, DoD continues to invest in micro-energy 
projects, allocating just under $80 million in FY2012 for this type of renewable energy 
project. The myriad of micro-energy projects not only failed to increase energy 
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production to target levels, but also failed to advance any real energy security 
improvements.[4] 
 
Despite these failures in renewable energy procurement, DoD decided to embark on an 
ambitious plan to meet its goals.  DoD is actively exploring ways to develop renewable 
energy on its installations instead of purchasing renewable energy credits.  Each 
department of the military (Air Force, Navy, Army) has set a goal of developing 1 GW of 
power from renewable energy by 2025.  DoD plans to couple its goal of 3 GW of 
renewable power with efficient distribution using micro grid technology.   Micro grid 
technology allows an installation to not only generate its own power, but also control the 
distribution and storage of that power.  DoD estimates that such a system would allow a 
military installation to achieve independence from conventional power resources and 
reduce energy vulnerabilities.[4]  
Yet improvements in grid control will do little good if the power supply is neither 
constant nor sufficient.  Achieving 3 GW of self-produced power is an unrealistic goal 
given the current energy production model.  Unless the Department of Defense considers 
alterative sources of energy for on-site production, it will never achieve 3 GW of self-
produced power.  It will also never truly be postured to meet the basic mission 
requirements needed to support the people of the United States in the event of a state side 
national crisis.   
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Chapter	  6:	  	  Finding	  a	  Solution	  to	  Energy	  Independence	  
The	  Sustainable	  Definition	  of	  Renewable	  Energy	  
“The Department’s vision of sustainability is to maintain the ability to operate into the 
future without decline-either in the mission or in the natural and man-made systems that 
support it.” (DOD SSS FY12) 
 
The Department’s definition of sustainability has two parts; (1) protecting its ability to 
operate and (2) protecting natural and man-made support systems. The World 
Commission on Environment and Development describes sustainability as “meeting the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet 
their own needs.”  Hidden within this generalized definition of sustainable exist many 
interconnect factors.[23] The first part of a sustainable energy solution for DoD is to meet 
its energy needs.  While DoD’s current initiatives protect future generations they fail to 
allow the organization to function in the future.  Failing to produce even 7% of its own 
power leaves DoD vulnerable to natural disasters, terrorist attacks and cyber threats.  
Increased energy production is vital to achieving energy security and to DoD developing 
a sustainability strategy that is both effective and lasting.  
 
DoD’s recently added goal to produce 3 GW of is own power by 2025 is ambitious, given 
its current levels of self-generation.  By comparison, Georgia Power announced in 
February of 2013 that it would be shutting down 15 coal and oil fired units by April 2015.  
These facilities had a combined production capability of 2.016 GW.[24] That is an 
average production loss of 134 MW per plant.  Only DoD’s China Lake facility rivals the 
production levels of conventional plants.  DoD’s current production ratio per renewable 
energy project, excluding China Lake and NNS Norfolk, is 0.21 MW per project. When 
only looking at small projects (less than 100 Bbtu/year produced), the ratio is even lower 
at .09 MW per project. Using the more generous ratio, DoD would need 14286 projects to 
produce 3 GW of power.    The Department of Defense must close the gap between its 
current renewable energy production and its energy demands in order to be sustainable.  
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In order to accomplish this, a reexamination of the definition of renewable technology is 
needed.6 
DoD	  Redefining	  Renewable	  Technology	  To	  Meet	  Its	  Needs	  
Under its current energy strategy DoD attempts to provide sustainability using renewable 
energy technology.  
 
 
Figure 13: DoD Renewable Energy Projects by Type[4] 
 
Figure 13 shows a breakdown of the renewable energy sources used by the Department of 
Defense in FY 2012 for its energy security projects.  EPA 2005 defines renewable 
technologies as  “electric energy generated from solar, wind, biomass, landfill gas, ocean 
(including tidal, wave, current and thermal), geothermal, municipal solid waste or new 
hydroelectric generation capacity achieved from increased efficiency or additions of new 
capacity for an existing hydroelectric project” (EPA2005)  The EPA 2005 definition is in 
regards to how the federal government defines power consumed that is creditably toward 
EPA 2005 goals.  A broader definition of renewable energy comes from the Department 
of Energy (DoE).  DoE defines renewable energy, as  
“Energy derived from resources that are regenerative or for all practical purposes can 
not be depleted.” [25] 
 
The DoE definition focuses on the sustainability aspects of renewable technology while 
the EPA2005 definition simply defines types of production.  The EPA2005 definition is 
not intended to promote innovative and new technological developments.  Instead it is 
                                                
6 The energy to power conversion rate is based on a 24-hour day, 365-day year and a production capacity 
of 90%. 
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simply to be used for the purposes of the act, as a guide for how organizations receive 
renewable energy credit under the law. EPA2005 was never intended to promote energy 
security on a large scale.  The intent of EPA 2005 was simple to promote conservation, 
reduce green house gas emissions and increase the use of currently recognized renewable 
energy platforms.   
 
To be a sustainable organization, DoD much approach energy production with a much 
larger technological aperture of than limiting guidelines of EPA 2005.  It must look to the 
root definition of renewable and apply it to technology promote its energy needs.  DoD 
needs a source of power that is robust in energy output in order to sustain the small-scale 
cities, which are its installations.  EPA2005 technologies do not produce power on the 
scale necessary to power a military installation.  DoD needs a power source that operates 
in a variety of climates providing a consistent source of power year round. EPA 2005 
technologies work in a spattering of climates with mixed rates of production dictated by 
seasonal conditions.  DoD needs a technology that once in place, has a proven record of 
lasting for long durations providing consistent power with little overhaul or replacement 
of major components.  EPA 2005 technologies are delicate and have not been shown to 
provide long lasting, consistent power outputs. Finally, DoD needs a power source that 
can operate in conjunction with the mission requirements of its installations without 
hindering operations.  The use of EPA 2005 technologies will require a selective 
approach to technology implementation due to potential drastic impacts on mission 
performance.  Thus, to truly meet its energy needs, the Department of Defense needs to 
re-evaluate its choice of renewable production technologies and find a source of long 
lasting, consistent, mission compatible power. To meet the spirit of EPA 2005, this power 
source must be renewable and reduce the production of green house gases.   
Renewable	  and	  Sustainable:	  Nuclear	  Power	  
 
As the Cold War intensified in the later half of the twentieth century, the Navy sought a 
new source of power.  The Navy needed a fuel for its submarine fleet so the vessels could 
travel long distances without the need for extensive supply chains.  In the 1950s, Admiral 
H. V. Rickover of the US Navy pioneered an incredible new idea by applying atomic 
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technology to the propulsion of vessels.   Working closely with partners in DoE, the 
Navy launched its first nuclear powered submarine, the USS Nautilus, in September of 
1954.  Nuclear power submariners could now stay submerged for extended periods and 
were limited only by life support restrictions of the crew.  By 1961, the Navy had its first 
nuclear powered aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise. [26]  Through the unique utilization 
of atomic technology, Admiral Rickover drastically altered the energy vulnerability of the 
Navy.   
 
Figure 14: Ohio Class Submarine USS West Virginia [27] 
 
Nuclear technology gave the Navy a significant operational advantage by allowing it to 
conduct submerged, strategic operations for extended periods.   Nuclear power allowed 
the Navy to remove these vessels from extensive, costly supply lines of coal and diesel 
fuel.  Resupply lines were vulnerable to attack from enemy vessels and required their 
own sustainment systems.  The shift to nuclear power was one of the most significant 
technological revolutions in marine operations.   
 
Just as in the Cold War period, the DoD of today is once again looking to technological 
solutions for its energy security and consumption challenges. Unfortunately, current 
renewable initiatives to produce power have been ineffective at achieving real energy 
independence. The outputs from solar arrays, wind turbines and most geothermal projects 
have so far failed to meet the energy needs of a military installation.  This paper suggests 
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that the DoD, following the lessons learned from its past, should once again look to 
nuclear energy as a sustainable solution to its power needs.  Nuclear energy is reliable, 
powerful, and consistent. Nuclear energy, while only producing 20% of the electricity in 
the United States, is operated as the base load power producer.  Nuclear power plants run 
continuously at maximum production capacity and only shutdown periodically for refuel 
operations.  They emit no greenhouse gasses. Reactor fuel can be mined as an ore, 
salvaged from demilitarized nuclear weapons or harvested from used reactor fuel.  
 
While the United States does not conduct nuclear fuel recycling in commercial facilities, 
many other countries recycle their nuclear waste. The US energy industry has not found it 
economical to recycle its fuel. The “once through” fuel cycle used by commercial 
operators in the United States leaves significant amounts of fissile material within the 
fuel. Spent LWR fuel contains much of the U238 isotopes as originally in the fuel as well 
as about 33% of the U235 isotopes.  There are also recoverable plutonium isotopes.[28]  
There are concerns about the proliferation of reprocessed material for improper uses, 
which has led to a US political policy that opposes reprocessing efforts.  
 
 
Figure 15: AREVA La Hague Reprocessing Facility in France[29] 
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The reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel isolates the useable isotopes from the waste 
materials in the fuel. The reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel reduces the amount of 
nuclear waste produced by one third. [23] The current amount of commercially generated 
spent nuclear fuel is about 65,000 metric tons.  This approximately spans one football 
field at a depth of 20 feet. [30] Viewing this as a potential resource pool, one could utilize 
the spent nuclear fuel again with reprocessing and reduce the amount of waste to the size 
of an NHL hockey rink at a depth of 67 feet.  Spent fuel reprocessing reduces not only 
the physical amount of nuclear waste but also significantly reduces the amount of 
isotopes with long radioactive half-lives While the commercial nuclear industry in the 
United States has not embraced reprocessing, the Defense Department does have 
experience reprocessing nuclear materials for commercial use.  
 
The technology exists to recycle the fuel for repeated uses.  Nuclear energy offers DoD a 
sustainable energy source that will allow installations to operate without decline in 
mission capabilities caused by lack of power.  Additionally, nuclear energy has minimal 
impact on the environment. It emits no toxic greenhouse gases like coal or gas fired 
facilities. Nuclear energy has a proven history of long-term reliability in both commercial 
and defense operations.  
Learning	  from	  the	  Past:	  The	  Army	  Nuclear	  Power	  Program	  
 
The idea of using a nuclear reactor to provide base power and heating is not a new idea.  
In the 1950s, the Army conducted a feasibly study with researchers at ORNL and 
determined that a nuclear reactor could be used to provide power and heating to remote 
installations.  In a joint project conducted with the US Army Corps of Engineers and the 
AEC, a pressurized LWR was constructed and operated at Ft. Belvoir VA for 16 years. 
Over the next decade, seven reactors were built and operated.  They provided heat and 
power to remote locations such as outposts in Greenland and Antarctica as well as to 
rural locations in the continental United States. The program even created a portable 
nuclear station on a floating barge platform that eventually was used to augment power in 
the Panama Canal Zone. A detailed history of the Army Nuclear Power program is found 
in Appendix A.  
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The Army Nuclear Power Program came to a close in the last 1960s and early 1970s.  
During that time, the Defense Department was shifting resources to support a war in 
Vietnam. The Army Nuclear Power Program was an expensive program because it 
developed 7 reactors that were all essentially prototype designs.  There was extensive 
cost in the research and design of each facility as they served unique purposes.  
Additionally, the commercial price of electricity was very cheap compared to price to 
produce power. Despite the closure of the program, the Army had incredible success with 
its some of its prototype reactors. 50 years after the end of the Army Nuclear Power 
Program, military installations find themselves dependent on civilian provided power. At 
the time of the Army Nuclear Power Program, Americans felt safely insulated on their 
continent from the threats of a foreign enemy. Proxy wars were fought in places like 
Vietnam and Afghanistan rather than on our streets.  Today, the world is interconnected 
through trade, information and the Internet.  It is a truly global environment and 
geographical separations have little impact on a determined enemy.  
 
 
Figure 16: Smog Surrounding 2008 Olympic Facilities in China[31] 
 
Additionally, at the time of the Army Nuclear Power Program, little concern was given to 
the harmful effects of burning fossil fuels. There was more concern with acquiring 
enough coal or gas resources to fire a plant than what harmful by-products came from the 
facility.  Today, the effects of fossil fuel burning are well known.  Pollutants released 
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from the burring of fossil fuels are linked to increase rates of respiratory diseases such as 
lung cancer.  Figure 16 illustrates the dire pollution problem in China showing an image 
of the 2008 Olympic facilities in China.[31] Production facilities utilizing the burning of 
coal or natural gas are under increased scrutiny by the American government and a 
concerned public.  
 
The increasing threat to our commercial power supplies combined with the desire to 
produce clean energy make the Army Nuclear Power Program a file in military history 
which should be reexamined for potential application.  
 	  
 40 
Chapter	  7:	  	  Small	  Modular	  Reactor:	  A	  New	  Era	  With	  an	  Advanced	  
Solution	  
 
Small modular reactors (SMRs) provide a flexible solution to power generation, to meet 
the diverse and growing demand for clean energy. “Small” is a relative term, and the 
IAEA defines SMRs as “small and medium reactors.” Power outputs for small reactors 
are less than 300 MWe while medium reactors produce less than 700 MWe.[32] The 
American Nuclear Society (ANS) defines Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) in its position 
statement #25, published in June 2011, as reactors producing less than 300 MWe.[33] 
The US Department of Energy shares the same position as ANS by defining SMRs as  
 
“nuclear power plants that [are] smaller in size (300 MWe or less) than current 
generation base load plants (1000 MWe or higher)”[34] 
 
Hence, the wide variation in production levels (ranging from a few MWe to almost 300 
MWe) allows for competitive market placement of the reactors to meet the needs of a 
specific community.  Smaller production outputs allow for flexibility when siting and 
commercializing SMRs.  SMRs offer solutions to communities that exist in remote 
locations.  Such locations often have long supply lines for energy sources like heating oil 
and are often located at the end of power transmission lines.  The long supply lines 
increase energy cost to remote locations and also make them prone to outages. 
Additionally, remote communities or developing countries might not have the electrical 
grid capacity capable of supporting a large power generation station.  However, the 
smaller grids would be capable of integrating a smaller electrical production facility into 
their network.[35] The size and scalability of SMRs also makes them a viable 
replacement for fossil fuel facilities as utility companies look to replace aging, high 
polluting plants with cleaner technology that still meets needed output demands.   
 
In addition to a more adaptable supply of electricity, the reactor facilities are modular. 
The primary components of the facility are constructed in a factory, separate from the 
power generation site and are then transported by highway or rail to power generation site 
and installed.  Though small and modular, new generation SMR designs incorporate 
enhanced passive safety features as well as improved control technology.  Due to the 
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plant’s small size and modular construction concept, SMRs should be more economical 
to produce, install and operate than the conventional base load nuclear power stations.  
 
Alternative and cogeneration uses for SMR facilities are presently under study. For 
example, district heating, desalination, hydrogen production and chemical production 
could all be powered using nuclear thermal energy.  A cogeneration SMR could bring not 
only provide a remote, arid community stable electoral power, but it could also serve as a 
heat source for desalination processes needed to supply fresh water.  The size, scalability 
and flexibility of SMRs make them an attractive, high potential product for the nuclear 
industry.  
 
SMR reactor technology is further broken into three distinct types of reactors: light water; 
high temperature gas; and liquid metal and liquid salt cooled.  
Light	  Water	  Reactors	  
 
SMRs utilizing Light Water Reactor (LWR) technology most closely mirror the current 
commercial reactor designs.  Most SMR LWRs use pressurized water reactor technology 
(PWR).  PWRs use pressurized water as a cooling and heat transfer mechanism.  They 
produce steam that is then used in the production of electricity.  Operating within the 
thermal neutron energy spectrum, LWR designs typically use low enriched uranium for 
fuel (less than 5% U235) formed in the shape of fuel pin assembly and moderated with 
water. Fuel rods are grouped into bundles and arranged for optimal power density and 
fuel burn-up.  
 
The current regulatory structure is designed around the licensing of light water reactor 
facilities. LWR technology has well defined mechanical, material and structural standards 
for operating temperatures and pressures. Valve and pump technology is well developed 
as well as advanced neutron modeling techniques.  While there are some questions about 
differences when licensing a SMR LWR verses a large commercial facility, it is thought 
that a SMR LWR will be the easiest reactor design to license under the current regulatory 
structure due to design stimulatory. Most questions involving the licensing of SMRs 
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involve changes in scale due to the size of the reactor.  Other questions revolve around 
the licensing of individual modules verses an entire facility. Today’s licensees must 
submit licenses for each reactor built.   SMR developers hope to avoid licensing costs by 
licensing multiple modules with one license. Figure 17 shows a conceptual design for a 
NuScale SMR LWR module. 
 
 
Figure 17: NuScale SMR LWR Concept[36] 
 
 
 43 
High	  Temperature	  Gas	  Reactors	  
 
High temperature gas reactors (HTGR) are attractive for use in process heat applications 
due to their ability to produce a high temperature output.  High output temperatures are 
extremely important in the production of hydrogen as well as some chemicals. The 
production of hydrogen on an industrial scale could be beneficial as an alternative to 
fossil fuels when powering vehicles. The United States has successfully operated HTGRs 
in previous years and international organization have also expressed interested in gas-
cooled reactor technology. The current regulatory framework in the United States does 
not support the licensing of gas-cooled reactors. Small HTGRs not only will be subject to 
the same regulatory challenges associated with LWR SMRs related to their size and 
implementation but they will also face licensing challenges based on the advanced nature 
of their design. Despite the licensing challenges, they offer great flexibility for a 
customer in that they are ideal for cogeneration facilities.   
Liquid	  Metal	  and	  Liquid	  Salt	  Cooled	  Reactors	  
 
Liquid metal cooled reactors utilize liquid metals such as sodium or lead as their primary 
coolants. Liquid salt reactors use fluoride and chloride salts (also called molten salts) and 
are also being examined as alternative coolants to water. Sodium, lead and molten salt 
cooled reactors have successfully been built and operated previously in the United States 
as well as aboard.  These reactors have some unique safety features by virtue of using a 
liquid metal or salt for cooling rather than water or a gas. They operate at low pressures 
and have negative temperature void coefficients.  Some molten salt designs dissolve fuel 
into the liquid coolant rather than being forming it into a solid.  Liquid fuel designs have 
some nice passive safety features as well as being extremely proliferation proof. The 
technology of molten salt reactors is of interest to those seeking a long-term solution to 
the nuclear waste problem of legacy systems in the U.S. It is thought that a molten salt 
reactor operating on liquid fuel could be powered using spent nuclear fuel from LWR 
facilities with minimal reprocessing. Lead and sodium are both poor neutron moderators 
and therefore well positioned for fast reactor operations.   
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Licensing presents a major near term hurdle for liquid metal and liquid salt reactors. They 
are still very much in the research stages of production and have some material 
challenges to overcome. There is still research to be done in the development of materials 
that are corrosion resistant as well as studying the effects of radiation on these materials 
at high temperatures.  
SMR	  Applications	  of	  Advanced	  Reactor	  Technology	  
 
Advanced reactor technology research is progressing despite licensing challenges. Much 
of the research done in developing these reactors will help the industry as a whole.  The 
materials research, fuel development, and modeling methods used in advanced reactor 
design will improve current designs.  The research for advanced reactor technology is not 
limited to reactors generating less than 300 MWe.  The research is focused on developing 
advanced designs beyond the LWR concept.  Many of the reactor concepts developed 
could be applied to a community needing an SMR. Currently there are a number of 
advanced reactor designs of interest. DoE is working on its Next Generation Nuclear 
Plant (NGNP), which is based off an Areava design for an HTGR. [37] Other gas-cooled 
designs include the General Atomics Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) 
and the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor.[35] GE Hitachi is perusing a modular sodium 
cooled reactor called PRISM.[38] Toshiba is working on a sodium reactor called 4S.  The 
4S reactor is a fast reactor designed to operate for 30 years without refueling.[39] At Oak 
Ridge National Lab, a team is working to modify the Fluoride Salt Cooled High 
Temperature Reactor (FHR) into a small version called the SM-AHTR.[40] While 
advanced reactor technology is not yet technologically ready for commercialization, the 
research gains made are tremendous for the industry.   
Description	  of	  SMRs	  Considered	  
The following analysis compares four SMR designs.  The designs studied are 
 
1. Babcock and Wilcox mPower LWR 
2. NuScale LWR 
3. GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy PRISM 
4. Toshiba 4S 
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The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the reactor design.  Highlighted 
features include the reactor output, coolant methods, safety measures, and refuel 
intervals.   
	  
Light	  Water	  SMRs	  
The two best-known SMRs thought to be ready for commercial production are Babcock 
and Wilcox’s mPower reactor and NuScale Power’s SMR design.  These reactor designs 
gained notoriety as leaders in the field by receiving significant funding support from the 
Department of Energy to develop small reactor technology. Both reactors utilize LWR 
technology. Westinghouse is also developing a LWR SMR design called W-SMR.  
Recent reports however indicate that Westinghouse plans to reprioritize its efforts away 
from SMR technology to focus on its AP1000 large commercial PWR.  The 
Westinghouse change in strategy comes after twice failing to receive funding support 
from the Department of Energy to promote SMR technology.[41] 
MPower	  
B&W’s mPower reactor is a small, light water reactor that integrates the latest passive 
safety features into proven reactor concepts.  The reactor vessel contains the core, the 
control rod drive mechanism, the steam generator and the pressurizer.  The core is fueled 
by low enriched uranium that is similar in configuration to today’s large scale reactors.  
Core reactivity is maintained through the use of control rods.  The control rod drive 
mechanisms are located in the lower vessel and below the pressure boundary, which 
exists between the core in the lower vessel and the steam generator in the upper the 
vessel.  This reduces the risk of control rod ejection.  Additionally the control rods have 
the passive safety feature of gravity activation in the event of loss of power. Figure 18 
shows the location of key components within the mPower reactor.  
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Figure 18: Babcock and Wilcox mPower SMR[42] 
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Light water reactors require constant cooling and thus it is paramount in an emergency 
situation that the core remains covered in water. Due to the one-vessel integrated design 
of the mPower reactor, all reactor coolant stays within the vessel.  Figure 19 shows the 
primary and secondary coolant loops of the mPower reactor. There are small penetrations 
in the reactor vessel to provide for coolant sampling and letdown but they are located 
well above the core.  This design, coupled with a large water inventory inside the vessel, 
allows for the core to remain covered in the event of an accident.  There are additional 
tanks within the containment building holding enough water to provide cooling for a 
minimum of 7 days. The core utilizes gravity and natural circulation for cooling which 
aids in removing decay heat without the use of emergency diesel generators.  Finally, the 
containment building itself is located below ground and is resistant to both flooding and 
seismic events.   
 
 
Figure 19: B&W Coolant Flow Diagram[42] 
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The B&W mPower reactor produces 155 MWe (530MWth) for each module. At a height 
of 83 feet and a diameter of 13 feet, the modules are very small compared to their 
commercial, large-scale brethren.  They are modular in construction.  Movements of the 
major reactor components can be done via rail or road.  The mPower reactor has a 
refueling interval of 4 years. The containment building also has a spent fuel pool for 
cooling used fuel until it can be transferred to dry cask storage or a geologic repository.  
B&W significantly reduced the size of the reactor facility.  A two-module facility sits on 
only 40 acres.  Table 5 lists some key design characteristics of the mPower reactor.  
 
Table 5: mPower SMR LWR Design Characteristics[43] 
 
 
 
The Tennessee Valley Authority plans to use B&W’s mPower reactor to power is SMR 
reactor facility under development at Clinch River Tennessee. This will be the first SMR 
reactor facility to undergo licensing, development and implementation is thought to be a 
pilot project for the SMR proof of concept. [42]  
 
NuScale	  
 
The NuScale reactor is also a small light water reactor utilizing the latest in active and 
passive design features to produce a safe, scalable power solution.  Similar to the mPower 
design, the NuScale reactor uses a standard light water reactor fuel bundle (17X17 
configuration) enriched at just under 5% U235.  Within the NuScale reactor vessel lies 
Feature mPower
Thermal.Output.(MWth) 530
Electrical.Output.(MWe) 155
Diameter:-13-ft.
Height: 83 ft.
628-Tons-w/o-fuel
716 Tons w/ fuel
Fuel.Enrichment <-5%-U235
17x17-fuel-pin-array
95 in active length
69 bundles
Refueling.Interval 4-years
Coolant.outlet.Temp 320-oC
Land.Requirements 40-Acres-(2Gpack)
Vessel.Size
Vessel.Weight
Fuel.Shape
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the core, the control rod drive mechanisms, two steam generators and the pressurizer.  
The NuScale reactor utilizes natural circulation to move heated coolant water from the 
core, up through the steam generator and then returns it to the core.  As the heated 
coolant water rises through the steam generator, it conducts heat to the secondary coolant 
loop within the steam generator.  It then condenses and falls back to the bottom of the 
vessel with the aid of gravity and is once again heated by the core.   
 
The reactor utilizes two passive heat removal features in the event of an emergency.  The 
reactor vessel sits in a reactor pool.  The decay heat removal system (DHRS) removes 
heat by routing coolant from the two steam generators to condensers submerged in the 
reactor pool.  Rather than sending steam to a generator for power production, the steam 
transfers heat to the pool to aid in decay heat removal.  Figure 20 illustrates the DHRS 
integrated onto a NuScale reactor.  
 
 
Figure 20: NuScale DHRS[36] 
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The second passive heat removal feature is the emergency core systems (ECCS).  It 
recirculates primary coolant within the reactor vessel.  As heated primary coolant rises to 
the top of the vessel, vents open at the top and allow the heated water to escape (as 
steam) from internal section of the reactor vessel. The steam condenses on the inside of 
the exterior wall the reactor vessel and falls to the bottom. As the coolant level on the 
exterior portions of the vessel rises, it aids in cooling the rector from the outside. Once 
the external water level reaches the top of the vessel, vents at the bottom of the reactor 
open allowing the water to circulate through the internal portions of the core and out the 
top of the vessel in one loop. Figure 21 illustrates the movement of emergency cooling 
utilizing the ECCS.  
 
 
Figure 21: NuScale ECCS[36] 
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The NuScale reactor has a power output of 45 MWe (160 MWth). The reactor vessel is 
small compared to conventional plants with a single module weighting 650 tons and 
standing 80 feet high.  It is modular in construction and can be shipped via rail, road or 
barge.  The physical size of the reactor facility is very small. A reactor facility containing 
12 modules (540 MWe production) sits on a facility that is only 44 acres.   
 
Due to the power output of the NuScale plants, they are very adaptable to the needs of a 
community.  Configurations of up to 12 modules can be linked to support the specific 
needs of a community. Table 6 illustrates some of the key characteristics of a NuScale 
Module.  
 
Table 6: NuScale Reactor Characteristic Summary[44] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feature
Thermal+Output+(MWth)
Electrical+Output+(MWe)
Fuel+Enrichment
Refueling+Interval
Coolant+outlet+Temp
Land+Requirements
Vessel+Size
Vessel+Weight
Fuel+Shape
NuScale
160
45
Diameter:.15.ft.
Height: 80 ft.
Standard.LWR.fuel.(<5%.
U235)
17x17.fuel.rod.assembly
78 in length
24.months
44.Acres.(12.Module)
650.tons.as.shipped
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A NuScale reactor has a 24-month refuel interval.  The unique design of the NuScale 
reactor facility allows for simultaneous refuel and power production operations.  Figure 
22 illustrates the layout of a 12 module NuScale reactor facility with refueling bay and 
spent fuel pool.[36]   
 
 
Figure 22: 12 Module NuScale Reactor Facility Layout[36] 
To refuel a module, it is physically removed from the reactor bay and placed in the 
refueling bay.  There, it is isolated from the operating reactor modules.  In the refuel bay 
it undergoes refuel and maintenance operations.  The integrated, continuous refuel cycle 
of the NuScale facility reduces the impact of refuel operations on the plant operator. 
Rather than occasionally shutting down to conduct large scale refuel operations, the 
operator utilizes a small specially trained team that focuses only on continuous refuel 
operations.  
 
Liquid	  Metal	  
PRISM	  
The PRISM reactor is a sodium fast reactor (SFR).  GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, as part 
of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), is developing it as a solution to spent 
nuclear fuel challenges.  The goal of the GNEP is to develop an Advanced Recycling 
Center (ARC) to reprocess used nuclear fuel. The PRISM reactor is a central component 
of the recycle process, as it would operate on the recycled fuel.  
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The PRISM core has metallic fuel.  The fuel is formed within the recycling center.  The 
composition of the fuel and its configuration within the core will change depending on 
the mission of the PRISM reactor.  PRISM missions could include the recycle of 
actinides, breeding fuel or consuming highly enriched fuel from nuclear weapons.  The 
PRISM is intended to be a solution to many different nuclear fuel cycle challenges.  The 
primary mission of the PRISM is intended to be spent fuel recycle.   
 
 
Figure 23: PRISM Coolant Loops and Balance of Plant[38] 
 
The PRISM has three independent coolant loops as seen in Figure 23. The primary 
coolant loop uses sodium to cool the core and transfers heat to an intermediate sodium 
coolant loop. Heat transfer between the loops occurs within the containment vessel. The 
intermediate loop acts as an interface to the power generation portion of the plant. It 
transfers heat to tertiary coolant loop containing water.  This loop is then used to make 
steam and provide power.  There are a number of leak detection and isolation systems 
used to prevent the incursion and mixing of coolant or air between the loops.   
 
The PRISM has a power output of 311 MWe, which is slightly higher than the ANS 
definition of an SMR.  The ARC design calls for the operation of six PRISM modules. 
By having six modules the ARC has maximum flexibility. It has multiple fuel recycle 
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platforms, each configurable for the type of spent fuel in need of processing. Each 
PRISM can be configured to support and different fuel recycling mission and they can be 
operated simultaneously.  While its design is not intended for use as a stand-alone 
facility, it does present a viable design concept for building a small scale SFR.[38]   
 
4S	  
The Super-Safe, Small, and Simple (4S) sodium cooled reactor is being designed by 
Toshiba Corporation and the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry 
(CRIEPI). Its intended purpose is to support extremely remote locations and operate 
continuously without refuel for 30 years.  Because the reactor is intended for use in 
remote locations, it is design to operate with very little maintenance and supervision.  The 
reactor has an output of 10 MWe (30 MWth).  It is modular in construction and can be 
transported by barge.  Due to its small size, single fuel load and minimal operating costs, 
this reactor is very economical.  The reduced cost of the reactor make it a possible 
candidate to provide long term power to small, remote locations.  
 
The 4S is a sodium fast reactor that uses metallic fuel consisting of 18% enriched U235. 
The fuel is formed into metallic fuel pins. These pins are typically one of the lifetime 
limiting factors of a reactor.  The cladding on fuel pins is susceptible to thermal creep. 
The 4S fuel pins mitigate this with thick cladding as well as a central gas plenum within 
the pin. This gas plenum is what enables the reactor to have a much longer lifetime than 
the typical reactor. Figure 24 illustrates the location of the glass plenum within the 
metallic fuel pin. 
 
 
Figure 24: 4S Fuel Pin Configuration with Gas Plenum[39] 
 
Reactivity is controlled through the combined use of a reflector and a fixed central 
absorber. By balancing the position of these features, the reactive can be controlled with 
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course movements for startup and shutdown as well as fine movements to balance burn 
up.  There is also a shutdown rod in the center of the core that can be used for emergency 
shutdown. Either the removal of the reflector or the insertion of the shutdown rod is 
capable of providing the necessary negative reactivity to shut the core down on its own.   
 
The 4S uses a three-coolant loop system similar to the PRISM reactor.  The primary 
sodium loop is used to cool the core and is internal to the core vessel. The intermediate 
loop transfers heat from the core using sodium to the tertiary loop containing water.  The 
tertiary loop is used to produce steam and makes electricity.  All loops have leak 
detection and isolation features.   
 
The 4S has several passive heat removal systems.  The Intermediate Reactor Auxiliary 
Cooling systems (IRACS) uses air to cool the intermediate loop.  Heat is removed from 
the core using the primary to intermediate loop interface. The IRACS then uses air, 
instead of water from the tertiary loop, to cool the intermediate loop. This air moves via 
natural circulation and vents excess heat into the atmosphere. It is an emergency system 
and is only intended for accident scenarios. The IRACS interfaces between the 
intermediate and tertiary loops.  Figure 25 shows the location of the IRACS.  
 
 
Figure 25: 4S Passive Reactor Safety Systems IRACS and RVACS[39] 
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The Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) removes heat by transferring 
directly it from the reactor vessel. The reactor vessel is surrounded by cylindrical heat 
collector, which is filed with air. Ambient air circulates within the collector providing 
decay heat transfer and removal from the reactor vessel.  The heat from the heat collector 
is discharged via exhaust stacks.  Figure 25 shows the RVACS location within the plant 
as well as a close-up of RVACS air circulation within the cylindrical heat collector.  Both 
systems operating alone provide enough cooling to keep with fuel within material safety 
standards.[39] 
Assessment	  of	  SMRs	  using	  Evaluation	  Criteria	  
 
I assessed each reactor design by rank ordering each design based on 9 assessment 
criteria. The following paragraphs define the assessment criteria.  The full analysis of 
each reactor and its score for each criterion is found in Appendix B. 
1. Safety 
2. Power Output 
3. Physical Size 
4. Refueling Cycle 
5. Licensing 
6. Public Acceptance 
7. Fuel Cost 
8. Maturity of Technology 
9. Process Heat Applications 
 
 
Safety	  
Safety considerations are paramount when choosing an SMR design. Many reactors 
utilize both passive and active safety features.  Having maximum passive safety features 
in the design is optimal.  Advanced reactor designs maximize massive safety features. 
Some reactor designs are more prone than others to certain types of accidents.  For 
example, LWR operate at high pressures to keep their coolant from boiling.  High-
pressure operations make LWR more prone to loss of pressure accidents than their liquid 
metal counterparts operating at low pressures. Companies conduct probabilistic risk 
analysis on their designs as they seek to license them. Those designs, which have 
complete or are near-complete analysis are preferable over those that are still testing their 
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designs. If a reactor has a functioning prototype with a proven safety history, this is also 
advantageous.  
Power	  Output	  
The amount of power produced by the reactor must meet the needs of the Department of 
Defense. Furthermore, it must be able to meet both electrical generation needs and have 
the capacity for utilization in process heat applications.  Many designs match desired 
output needs by increasing or decreasing the number of individual modules.  An increase 
in modules leads to an increase in overall cost as well as facility complexity.  A balance 
needs to be achieved by using the correct number of modules to meet installation needs.   
Physical	  Size	  
The size of the reactor facility is very important.  Military installations can be vast 
expanses of training grounds or restricted access, fenced locations nestled in the heart of 
a population center. Encroaching on civilian land would be both unpopular and expensive 
for the Department of Defense. Siting within the perimeter of a current installation would 
potentially reduce the amount of land available for training.  Minimizing the size impact 
of the reactor on installation military operations is extremely important. 
Refueling	  Cycle	  
The refuel cycle of the reactor is important to installation operations.  If the reactor 
provides sole power for the installation, it is important that an alternate supply of power 
is available for the base during refuel outages.  This is of particular importance if the 
reactor must be taken offline for extended periods. 
Licensing	  
 
The NRC’s current licensing framework is structured by the assumption that the projects 
to be supported for development are large, stationary light water reactors.  Many of the 
regulatory requirements for developers are driven by these assumptions. With the 
increasing interest in SMR applications and technology, the NRC is working to adjust its 
regulatory framework to support a more flexible design.  The NRC developed several 
new offices to aid in the licensing of SMRs. The NRC staff is hoping to review SMR 
designs and find generic resolutions to policy, regulatory and key technical issues related 
to these designs.  In addition, there are issues that arise specific to each application.  
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Issues such as how to handle the licensing of a process heat application, the licensing of a 
single or multi-module facility, and the appropriate size of the emergency planning zone 
(EPZ) all will require the development of a new regulatory framework. As designs drift 
further from the standard LWR reactor, the NRC must continue to ensure the safety of the 
public while promoting innovation and flexibility.  Large deviations from the traditional 
LWR design include the use of TRISO fuel particles, fuel enrichments greater than 5%, 
and alternative choices for primary coolant methods.[35] The American Nuclear Society 
position statement 25 which covers SMRs encourages the NRC to  
 
“enable timely adoption of SMR designs by assisting in the identification and resolution 
of generic SMR licensing issues as well as by establishing the most efficient and effective 
licensing approaches”[33] 
 
TVA’s Clinch River Project is of extreme importance to the nuclear industry in United 
States.  As energy providers to look consider using nuclear SMR technology as an option 
to modernize their fleet, there are many attractive economical and environmental 
characteristics.  The nuclear industry is highly regulated.  Developers are fearful to 
commit large capital investments into a technology that has a history of high regulation 
when that regulatory framework is still in development. An open, honest dialogue 
between the site developer, the reactor manufacturer and the NRC will result in 
reductions in ambiguity and the establishment of SMR licensing precedent for years to 
follow.  
Pubic	  Acceptance	  
DoD installations work closely with the communities that surround them to build 
cohesive relationships. The communities surrounding an installation, which chooses to 
install a nuclear power source, will face many questions about the safety of the facility 
and its impact on the community. DoD should strive to pick a reactor that will be readily 
accepted by the public. Forecasting public concerns and being prepared to counter those 
concerns with demonstrated, safe technology will increase the likelihood of public 
acceptance for a nuclear powered military installation.  
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Fuel	  Costs	  
The expense of nuclear fuel and its transportation is a factor is reactor selection. Fuel 
costs are influenced by manufacturing difficulty, resource availability and the refuel 
cycle.  Increased refuel intervals increases the cost of operation for the facility.  A unique 
fuel design, like TRISO fuel, will be costly if not yet produced on a commercial scale.  
Additionally, a reactor requiring refuel often will have increased fuel burdens. The 
installation will often shift operations to accommodate the transportation fuel to the 
facility.  Given the sensitive nature of nuclear fuel, transportation operations will require 
special protocols and procedures.  
Maturity	  of	  Technology	  
DoD needs a solution to its energy security challenges as soon as possible. There are 
many innovative reactor designs that exist either on paper or are still in the initial stages 
of testing.  Many reactors were developed in the middle of the 20th century but have not 
been operated in recent years.  These designs are viable but still need extensive testing.  
Designs with more maturity will be easier to for DoD to implement quickly.    
Process	  Heat	  Applications	  
Being able to use nuclear heat for applications other than electricity gives DoD flexibility 
in developing future energy solutions.  A military installation nuclear reactor should have 
the capacity to support both electricity production and process heat applications.  
 
The	  Small	  Modular	  Reactor	  For	  DoD	  
 
Advanced reactor technology offers the greatest long-term potential for the Department 
of Defense.  The passive safety features of liquid metal or salt cooled reactors make them 
a vastly superior design to the standard LWR design.  They have great potential for use as 
a nuclear waste solution as well as being used for power applications. They offer 
excellent resistance to proliferation. HTGRs offer the most potential for process heat 
applications.  These reactors can reach extremely high temperatures, which could be 
useful in producing hydrogen on an industrial scale.   If hydrogen fuel technology 
continues to advance, these reactors could play a key role in helping the defense industry 
wean itself from its annual $16 billion fuel bill.[6]    
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Figure 26: Coated Particle Fuel Development Lab at ORNL 
 
Most advanced reactor technology is still in the development and testing stages.  Many 
reactors have further research needed in materials development, fuel enhancement, and 
modern modeling techniques. As these advanced designs are optimized, they must 
undergo extremely rigorous probabilistic risk analysis in order to satisfy the safety 
requirements of the U.S. nuclear industry.  Work is being done across the country in DoE 
labs as well as at universities to find solutions to these challenges.  Figure 26 shows the 
Coated Particle Fuel Lab at ORNL which works on developing improved solid fuel 
designs for advanced reactors.[45]   
 
International organizations are also aggressively working on advanced reactor 
technologies.  In his 2011 testament before the U.S. Senate, Joe 
Calvin, then president of the ANS, noted 
 
“The nuclear supply infrastructure has become thoroughly internationalized in the last 
three decades…it is clearly preferable to have U.S. involvement in the global nuclear 
marketplace, rather than ceding the territory to non-US suppliers that may not always 
share our approach toward safety and nonproliferation.”[46] 
 
The research conducted will be used to support the licensing and construction of 
prototype and test facilities.  Once researchers construct a prototype and the NRC 
develops a regulatory framework, the designs will be more attractive to commercial 
developers and investors.  
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However, the Department of Defense needs a solution to its energy security 
vulnerabilities now.  As the defense industry becomes more technical and energy 
dependent, installations require a continuous source of power to conduct even the most 
basic of military operations. The rising threat from cyber security attacks as well as 
natural disasters make military installations increasingly vulnerable.  Even a simple, 
physical attack could cripple a military installation if targeting its electrical supply lines.  
DoD is aggressively seeking solutions to reduce its energy demand by spending almost 
$1 billion annually on reduction initiatives.  While these efforts are somewhat effective, 
simply turning off more lights, unplugging coffee pots and changing climate control 
settings fail to match the rising real energy consumption of the armed forces.   
 
The military becomes more reliant on technology daily. Gone are the days of a military 
signal corps using flags and smoke to pass messages.  Today, commanders at even the 
lowest level carry smartphones and provide daily status reports via automated reporting 
systems.  The signal corps long since retired its flags and replaced them with Joint 
Network Nodes capable of establishing communication and Internet links in remote, 
austere locations.  A private on a remote hilltop in Afghanistan can send an enemy status 
report to his headquarters at Bagram Airfield as easily and often as a college student 
checks social media.  Resupply requests, movement orders and personnel evaluations, are 
all delivered electronically.  Meetings are conducted in person as well as via video 
teleconference linking commanders in locations all across the world.   
 
 
Figure 27: Joint Network Node[47] 
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Without a steady supply of power, military operations come to an abrupt stop. 
Implementation of SMR technology today, prior to full commercialization, provides DoD 
an immediate, reliable power supply.  
 
While advanced reactor technology is attractive because of its potential, small modular 
light water reactors are expected to be in commercial operation in the very near future.  In 
February 2013, TVA and B&W signed an agreement to pursue licensing an SMR facility 
at Clinch River.  With DoE financial support of $452 million in funding over five years, 
50% of the licensing and design costs will be funded by DoE.  DoE hopes to have the 
mPower design certified by the NRC by 2015 and a commercial demonstration of SMRs 
by 2022.[48] The progress shown by TVA, B&W and NuScale in partnership with DoE 
and the NRC shows promise for the world of small modular reactors.  SMRs can bring 
safe, reliable, clean power to American in a scalable format to fit the needs of each 
community.  They are ideal suited to fit the varied needs of the Department of Defense as 
it seeks to eliminate its energy Achilles heel.  
 
Indeed SMRs might also be at least part of the solution to DoD’s energy security 
problem. However, in speaking with an official from the Army Office for Installations, 
Energy and Environment it is clear that DoD does not want to be a prototype validator for 
a new energy technology. Rather, DoD prefers to leave such innovation to its partners in 
DoE.[49] This does not mean however, that the Defense Department is not open to new 
ideas.  The Defense Department routinely applies new technology in unique ways as it 
adapts technology for military use. In applying nuclear technology to power its 
installations, the Department of Defense must be very conscious of public opinion.  
Military installations already receive a great deal of public scrutiny due to the unique 
nature of the operations conducted on installations.  Military installations do their best to 
coexist tranquilly with their neighbors and the military often conducts more disruptive 
maneuvers at installations far removed from civilian population sectors.  When 
implementing a new energy strategy on its installations that capitalized on the benefits of 
nuclear power, the military would need to carefully select its reactor choice. A reactor 
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design that has the full support of DoE, the NRC and is in use in a commercial facility 
will be far more publically acceptable than an advanced, prototype design.  
 
Appendix B contains an assessment of each SMR considered for use in an energy 
solution for the Department of Defense.  Table 7 from that Appendix is below.  The table 
contains the decision assessment rankings used for selecting the SMR. The assessment 
evaluation takes into consideration the unique purpose and constraints associated with 
using a nuclear reactor to power a DoD installation. Each reactor is rank ordered from 
one to four with a score of one being given to the reactor design that is most apt to 
meeting the needs of DoD given the individual criterion.  The criteria are equally 
weighted.  The reactor with the lowest score is best suited for a DoD energy security 
solution.  
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Table 7: SMR Assessment Criteria Rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reactor mPower NuScale PRISM 4S
Safety 3 2 4 1
Power/Output 1 2 3 4
Physical/Size 2 3 4 1
Refueling/Cycle 2 3 4 1
Licensing 1 2 4 3
Public/
Acceptance
1 2 4 3
Fuel/Costs 1 2 4 3
Maturity/of/
Technology
1 2 4 3
Process/Heat/
Applications
1 3 2 4
Score 13 21 33 23
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The mPower reactor is the best available SMR design for the Department of Defense.  
The amount of energy needed on a military base to secure its installation energy future is 
not enormous.  Most installations have all their electricity needs met by a reactor that 
produces less than 100 MWe.  A single mPower reactor produces 130 MWe while a 
NuSclae module produces 45 MWe. The power capacity of an mPower facility gives 
installations maximum flexibility on how they operate the reactor. If running at full 
capacity, the installation can sell unused, excess power to a local utility. It can operate at 
reduced capacity and decrease its burn rate, which will extend its lifetime.  When 
operating at 90% capacity, the reactor does not require refuel for 4 years. Due to the 
military application of the facility, designers could present a modified design that uses a 
fuel with a higher level of enrichment so as to further increase time between refueling.  
Naval vessels run on highly enriched fuel allowing them extremely long operation 
intervals between refueling.    
 
NuScale technology is capable of increasing power output by increasing the number of 
modules in the facility. This would allow DoD some flexibility in how it sited the 
reactors on each installation.  NuScale modules require frequent refueling at 24 months.  
Their multi-module approach does offer the capability of conducting refuel operations 
without shutting down the entire facility.  A frequent refuel interval will produce more 
waste than an mPower facility requiring on-site storage in either spent fuel pools or dry 
casks.  This is not ideal for a military installation on which space is precious commodity. 
Designers could look at the effects of increasing the level of fuel enrichment on a 
NuScale design as well to see if the refuel interval could be increased.     
 
With its current design, an mPower SMR is perfectly suited to meet the Department of 
Defenses installation energy needs and any future demand increases.  As DoE, TVA, 
B&W and the NRC validate the mPower design and put it into application at Clinch 
River, DoD should look closely at how to apply the reactor facility to military use.  The 
following paragraphs present how an mPower reactor would be applied for us on a 
military installation.  
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Chapter	  8:	  	  m2Power:	  A	  Military	  Modular	  Reactor	  to	  Meet	  DoD’s	  
Needs	  
 
A modular military reactor provides a sustainable solution to DoD’s energy security 
vulnerabilities.  An m2Power reactor is a B&W mPower reactor modified to serve the 
needs of a military installation. In examining the impact of an m2Power reactor on a 
military installation, there are multiple considerations.  Many of these factors are the 
same as used when analyzing the impact of renewable energy sources on installations.  
Some considerations are 
 
• Power Output 
• Process Heat Applications 
• Physical Size 
• Mission Impact 
• Environment 
• Security 
• Reactor Accident Impact on Military Operations 
• Military Accident Impact on Reactor Operations 
• Manning and Management 
• Transportation 
• Waste Management 
 
 
The following paragraphs examine each of these considerations and the impact of an 
SMR operating on a military installation. 
 
Power	  Output	  
Military installations are in essence small cities.  They have their own fire protection and 
police force. Most have a hospital or medical facility.  There are full time residents who 
live in military housing on the installation.  Some residents are single and live in soldier 
barracks while others are families living in duplexes or single-family homes.  The vast 
 67 
majority of the buildings are used to support or sustain military operations.  These 
buildings range from office buildings, to mechanical support facilities to physical fitness 
centers.  There are also a number of small businesses on a military installation such as 
fast food restaurants, grocery stores and gas stations.  
 
The power demands of the installation are proportionally related to its size and 
geographic location.  Figure 28 shows the MW usage of some military installations 
previously discussed.   
 
 
Figure 28: Select Installation Power Demands (MW) FY 2012 [4] 
 
The installation consuming power at the largest rate is FT Bragg, NC. It consumed power 
at an annual rate of approximately 130 MW in 2012.  Fort Bragg is operational a very 
large military installation.  It houses the headquarters of some of the largest components 
of the military.  It has approximately 57,000 military personnel, 11,000 civilians and 
23,000 family members making a small city with a population just under 100,000 
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personnel.  It is one of the largest military complexes in the world.[50] Its high power 
demands are possibly attributed to the amount of personnel operating daily at the 
installation. Other installations with high power needs can be found in extreme climates.  
Fort Wainwright Alaska and Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado both have high power 
demands at 112 MW and 81 MW respectively.7  
 
These figures represent the highest energy demands for installations in the military.  
Thus, it is possible to use a reactor smaller than a conventional power facility to support 
an installation.  Installations within DoD could be support by a reactor producing 150 
MWe such as the mPower reactor.  Many have consumption levels less than 100 MW.  
Installations with less electoral demand could put excess energy toward process heat 
applications or the military could sell the energy back to a local utility.  The size and type 
of energy demands on a military installation make them ideally suited for the use of an 
m2Power reactor.   
Process	  Heat	  Applications	  
In recent years, the need for process heat in industrial applications rose significantly.  In 
2012, the IAEA released the results of a study about the use of nuclear power in process 
heat applications.  The study focused on the use of high temperature gas reactors. The 
goal was to determine if nuclear power could be used in the process heat applications 
requiring the highest thermal energies. One of the most environmentally significant of 
these applications is the production of hydrogen, which requires a reactor output coolant 
temperature greater than 700oC.  Hydrogen is thought to be considered an viable possible 
alternative to fossil fuels in vehicles as well as being an excellent large scale energy 
storage medium.   
 
Another useful application of thermal energy is in nuclear desalination.  Nuclear 
desalination is a low temperature reaction occurring at coolant output temperatures from 
100 oC to 140 oC. Other desalination processes use fossil fuels to provide thermal energy 
and have significant greenhouse gas emissions and costs associated with pollution 
                                                
7 The energy to power conversion rate is based on a 24-hour day, 365-day year and a production capacity 
of 90%. 
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control.  Desalination technology is used in countries with limited access to fresh water 
but access to salt water sources.   
 
District heating is useful in providing heat to communities existing in extremely cold 
climates.  District heating uses reactor output coolant temperatures of 80 oC to 150 oC.  
District heating is most effective in small communities where the produced heat does not 
have to travel long distances (less than 5 km).  A small community district heat network 
is sustainable with 10-50 MW(th). 
 
Other applications of nuclear generated process heat include oil recovery and the 
production of chemicals.  Oil recovery operations using nuclear produced steam appears 
to be most successful in extraction of oil from sand.  A CANDU cogeneration facility 
could be useful in extracting oil from Canadian oil sands and providing electricity when 
oil production is low.  Chemical industries use process heat for a wide variety of 
applications, which require the splitting of hydrocarbons.  This is a key step in the 
production of gas and hydrogen.  Figure 29 illustrates a wide variety of industrial process 
heat applications and the output coolant temperatures needed to conduct these 
applications. [51]  
 
 
Figure 29: Chemical Production Process Heat Requirements [52] 
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It is unlikely that the military will use process heat in a chemical production method.  The 
military itself produces very little of its own supplies.  It relies heavily on an extensive 
supply chain, which runs continuously to provide the products necessary to meet its 
needs.  The military supply system is almost entirely devoted to procurement rather than 
production.   While an m2Power reactor will not reach the temperatures needed to 
produce most chemicals or hydrogen, in future years, advanced SMRs will be able to 
reach the desired outputs.  Should hydrogen become a viable alternative to petroleum for 
vehicle and aircraft operations, the military might want to consider internally producing 
it.  By establishing the policies and procedures for reactor operations early, the military 
would be positioned to capitalize on the industrial production of hydrogen giving it 
operational energy independence.   
 
Process heat applications of an m2Power reactor could be useful to a military installation 
based on environmental considerations. Some of the largest energy consuming 
installations in DoD reside in extremely cold climates. Energy created by an m2Power 
reactor could be used in a cogeneration capacity on installations located in these extreme 
climates.  Fort Wainwright Alaska has average low temperatures below freezing for more 
than half the year. [53]It is a relatively small installation with only about 3400 acres (13.8 
km2) owned by the federal government. [54] Depending on the allocation of that 
property, it is likely that the central living and work facilities on the installation are in 
close proximity to each other.  This type of installation would be ideal for the use of an 
electricity and district heating cogeneration m2Power reactor.   
 
In addition, military retains within its assets water purification equipment.  This 
equipment depends on an existing supply of water.  Efforts are being made to find 
technology that could use desalination technology to aid in supporting the project of 
forces into arid climates.   A theoretical small, portable nuclear reactor could provide 
foreword-deployed forces with the power needed to run electrical equipment as well 
desalinate water.  While an m2Power facility is to a large to be considered truly mobile by 
military standards, using reactor technology on permanent installations in arid locations 
could help an installation becoming entirely Net Zero.  Not only could the facility 
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provide electricity, it could also provide water for installation use. Using an m2Power 
reactor in this capacity reduces two major sustainment vulnerabilities for the installation.   
Physical	  Size	  
Conventional nuclear power plants occupy enormous amounts of physical space.  
Southern Company’s nuclear power plant, Vogtle Unit 1 and 2, sits on a 3200-acre site 
34 miles southeast of Augusta Ga.  That is an incredible expanse of land used to support a 
single facility that is designed to produced over 2400 MW of power.[55] It is unrealistic 
to expect a plant of this to operate on a military installation.  By comparison, TVA’s is 
planning to use a 1200-acre site for its Clinch River project.  At Clinch River, TVA will 
be prepared to install multiple small modular reactors, each with an output of about 180 
MW.[56] B&W claims that a two-pack m2Power reactor could occupy a site the size of 
40 acres (.16 km2).  This is an incredibly small footprint and is advantageous to a military 
installation that might be limited on size by geological or man-made boundaries.  A 
single SMR could occupy an even smaller footprint.   
 
The size of the geographic footprint of the reactor facility plays a large role in both 
installation and reactor selection.  Some installations occupy vast expanses of land and 
are far removed from civilian populations.  Fort Irwin California is home to the National 
Training Center in Southern California. It is an expansive reservation of land used to 
conduct large scale military exercises.  It is far removed from any metropolitan area.  By 
contrast, Joint Base Lewis-McCord (JBLM) is an installation that is nestled in the I-5 
corridor just south of Tacoma, WA and less than an hour from Seattle.  While the 
potential for SMR site development could exist at Ft. Irwin in the California desert, it is 
unlikely that even a reactor facility as small as .16 km2 would be suitable for at Joint Base 
Lewis-McCord due to the population density.  Due to its physical size constraints, JBLM 
conducts much of its large-scale maneuver and weapons training at a remote facility near 
Yakima WA.  The Yakima training center would be more suited, due to its size and 
location, for the use of an m2Power reactor facility.    
 
Another consideration when locating an SMR on a military installation is the impact of 
the exclusion zone.[57] The NRC requires that all reactors have a defined exclusion zone 
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and low-population zone.  An exclusion area means that the licensee has “the authority to 
determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel or property from the 
area.”  This does not, however, prohibit movement within the zone.  The NRC clearly 
states that the area may be traversed by highway, rail or water as long as they do not 
interfere with plant operations.[58] If the facility is location on an installation, then 
installation commander will have complete authority over exclusion zone authorization.  
In addition, military installation occupants are familiar with locations on installations that 
have limited or restricted access.  These areas are usually well marked, monitored and at 
times physically guarded.  Controlling access in and around the facility should not impact 
training or operations as long as the site chosen allows for maximum flexibility of tenet 
units.   
 
The low population zone is an area containing residents where the  
“total number and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that 
appropriate protective measures could be taken in their behalf in the event of a serious 
accident.” 
 
In the case of a low-population zone, there are no defined numeric guidelines.[58] 
Christofer Mowry, the president of B&W mPower, claims the size and passive safety 
features of the mPower r reactor can reduce such a zone to as small as half a mile.[59] 
Much of the size depends on how quickly an area can responds to an accident. In the case 
of a military installation, on post residents and employees are routinely subject to 
emergency planning and security drills.   Incorporating nuclear accident scenario 
planning would follow already established similar protocols.  In addition, timeliness of 
the response will be greatly improved over a commercial plant because the 
communication structure of the military is streamlined through a single command 
channel. In a commercial facility, reactor operators must coordinate with multiple state 
and local agencies for support.  Military installation occupants are already trained and 
familiar with mass information distribution processes. 
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Mission	  Impact	  
The impact on mission performance is the most important factor when selecting a 
military installation for the use of SMR technology.  As with other forms of renewable 
energy, the SMR cannot detract from the organizations ability to train and conduct its 
mission.  Much of the mission impact of an SMR can be mitigated through procedural 
changes.  For example, an installation with high levels of rotary wing or fixed wing air 
traffic might have to modify approach and departure corridors to avoid over flight of an 
SMR facility.  This is not at all unusual for aircraft pilots as they commonly directed to 
avoid over flight of facilities.  Alternatively they could be allowed to overly the facility 
but only above certain altitudes.  
 
 
Figure 30: Considerations for reactor placement; military helicopter training [60] 
 
Using an SMR to power a geographically large, remote training center like Ft. Irwin is 
ideal.  Much of the FT Irwin reservation is an open maneuver facility that allows freedom 
of movement for tanks, personnel carriers and vehicles.  These vehicles would simply 
need to avoid the SMR facility.  These types of restrictions are familiar to military 
planners and have little impact on mission execution. In fact, at times they represent real-
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world scenarios where an invading force might chose to avoid an area so as to preserve 
historical or religious significance. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, many mosques were 
restricted targets because they were of religious significance to the local population.   
 
Additionally the facility could add to an aspect of military training that is not currently 
emphasized.  The potential for conflict with a nuclear powered or nuclear-armed country 
is possible for the US Military.  While it would be unwise to use an existing, operating 
facility as a location for conducting military training, there is some value from having to 
include it in operational planning.  By forcing military planners to incorporate real, rather 
than simulated, nuclear facility impacts into the mission development process, the 
scenarios used for training will be a more realistic simulation of the potential future 
conflicts.   
 
To develop a reactor site on an installation, developers must interface closely with their 
military partners.  The developers must have a full and complete understanding of the 
installation operations.  They must ensure that the military is aware of all possible 
impacts on performance.  Finally, site developers must understand that on a military 
installation, the base commander holds the final decision authority.  He or she will 
consider many factors when siting a reactor facility.  Developers must be open and 
understanding of his or her concerns. 
 
Environment	  
The environmental conditions impacting a military installation will be a key factor in site 
selection.  The military gains the most economical benefit by selecting an installation that 
not only has a high electrical energy demand but also has an overall high energy 
consumption due to environmental factors.  Extreme weather conditions are commonly 
found at military installations. Locations like Ft Wainwright Alaska and Ft Drum New 
York are known for being very cold.  Alternatively, the Twenty-Nine Palms, CA or Ft. 
Bliss Texas record some of the highest temperatures at military installations. Installations 
in extreme cold climates could benefit from the district heating capabilities of an SMR 
cogeneration facility.  Installations having high power demands for heating or cooling 
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which is located the end of transmission lines might find it more cost effective to simply 
produce their own power. The environment will shape which installations are good 
candidates for SMR technology in a similar way that it shapes siting for commercial 
reactor locations. Environmental risks to SMRs are similar to the risks to commercial 
reactors.  Installations prone to high seismic activity should be avoided.  Facilities 
threated by high tidal swells or hurricane activity must mitigate these risks with severe 
weather plans, increased facility hardening and back-up systems.  Many of the same tools 
used to analyze environmental risks to commercial reactors will apply to the placement of 
SMRs.   
Security	  
 “Nuclear power plants continue to be among the best-protected private sector facilities 
in the Nation.” –NRC[58] 
 
NRC regulation 10 CFR Part 73 governs the physical protection requirements of plants 
and materials.  The NRC requires the use of an extensive security network to ensure the 
safeguards of our nations nuclear facilities. It states that facilities are  
 
“well-protected by physical barriers, armed guards, intrusion detection systems, area 
surveillance systems, access controls, and access authorization requirements for 
employees working inside the plants.”[58] 
 
Siting it on a military installation would enhance reactor security.  Military installations 
are limited access.  They have access control points at all locations. Figure 31 shows an 
access control point at Ft. Campbell, KY.[61]  
 
 
Figure 31: Military Installation Access Control Point 
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Installations are surrounded by physical barrier systems. Manned security patrols operate 
24 hours a day year round.  Individual units on the installations each have their own 
security patrols, which operate after business hours to ensure basic physical security 
measures are in place.  The military provides continuous security on its installation due to 
the concentration of weapons, equipment and ammunition stored on site.  Personnel are 
trained in the detection of unusual behavior as well as how to report and respond to 
threats.  Installations conduct annual drills emphasizing force protection and each 
origination has planned measures to take in the event of a threat or attack on the 
installation.  Individual buildings on the installation have limited access due to the nature 
of the building, which require identification checks, badging, and other security protocols.  
Members of the armed services are familiar with operating in a security centric 
environment.  
 
Facility security could be provided by armed service members or outside contractors.  It 
is not unusual for DoD to use contracted security on its installations.  Many installations 
have contracted gate security officers and police forces.  Using a contracted security force 
would allow for guards to receive specialize training on reactor specific threats. The use 
of contractors would also be much less costly to the Defense Department, which would 
not have to train and develop a specialized force of reactor security personnel. The 
interface between reactor security personnel and installation security forces would be 
similar to the procedures used on installations with contracted gate security forces.   
 
Reactor	  Accident	  Impact	  on	  Military	  Operations	  
The impact of a reactor accident on the installation will be the one of the most important 
concerns to an installation commander.  Of primary concern to the commander will be 
the physical impact on installation personnel.  Additionally, he or she will need to know 
how an incident will impact military operations.   
 
Clear and complete reactor accident analysis is integral to all forms of nuclear reactor 
development.  It will be no different when siting a reactor on a military installation.   The 
NRC mandates the study of effects of a reactor incident on the local population.  The 
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most important metric in this analysis is the possible dose given to the population. In 
addition, an installation commander will need to know the evacuation requirements. He 
or she will want to know if and when reentry onto the installation is possible.  The 
military will not allow for a scenario that renders the base and all its equipment unusable 
for a long period of time.   
 
Safety features on the m2Power reactor significantly reduce the likely hood of accidents.  
As the design completes the NRC certification process, probabilistic risk analysis will 
validate these features.  All nuclear processes adhere to the double contingency principle 
meaning that no single event should be cause for failure.  The industry applies “defense 
in depth” to all designs requiring multiple redundancies for systems. Many reactor 
systems employ passive features that cause the reactor to dissipate heat or shut down with 
no action from the operator.  Additionally, reactors contain active controls that trigger 
immediate shutdowns in the event of abnormal or questionable conditions. Accidents are 
mitigated through routine and extensive training.  Training teaches operators how to 
respond to recognize and prevent an accident. The nuclear industry is the safest power 
industry in America due in part to the extensive training undergone by operators.  
Military personnel conduct training on a daily basis.  Some events are at the individual 
level while others can include thousands of personnel and pieces of equipment.  The 
military is exceptional at planning, resourcing and conducting training.  The 
incorporation of a nuclear training program on a military installation would be nested 
within the overall training plans for the base.  
 
Military	  Accident	  Impact	  on	  Reactor	  Operations	  
Unique to the challenges facing SMR site selection on a military installation is the 
potential impact military munitions accidents on the reactor.  Risks associated with the 
impact of a military accident must be closely examined. This will be one of the largest 
and probably most publically discussed risks associated with military reactor power.  
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The NRC mandates the examination of the potential hazards from military facilities in 10 
CFR 100.21(e).  
 
“Military facilities must be evaluated and site characteristics established such that 
potential hazards from such routes and facilities will pose no undue risk to the type of 
facility proposed to be located at the site.”[58] 
 
 
The type of accident presenting the highest risk will be installation dependent.  A naval 
air station is more likely to have an aircraft accident.  A heavy maneuver division of the 
Army is more likely to have a weapons malfunction or range fire.  This level of risk 
analysis is not an insurmountable challenge. The Navy has procedures that allow for the 
operation of aircraft, the loading of munitions and movement of other vessels in and 
around its nuclear powered equipment. It conducts operations safely and without incident 
because it has established the procedures and training to ensure safety.  Army personnel 
operate large weapons systems in careful, controlled environments.  Thorough planning 
and analysis of the effects are part of every operation using weapons systems.  The 
simplest mitigation technique for large weapons systems is geographically isolating the 
firing locations.  Many weapons in the military’s arsenal can only be fired at certain, 
controlled locations.  Some weapons training is even done via simulation.   
 
 
Figure 32: Paladin Weapon System[62] 
 
Many geographically large, remote installations are used weapons ranges. Systems fired 
here cannot be close proximity to dense population centers.  The location also makes the 
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installation an ideal candidate for SMR power.  A reactor would need to be located not 
only outside the direct impact areas of these ranges but also outside the area where 
malfunctioning systems could impact.  Impact planning is done routinely by the military.  
Impact experts understand the effects of their weapons functioning both properly and 
when they malfunction. The effects of ranges are integrated into all development 
planning on military installations.  A unique consideration would be the seismic effects 
on the reactor systems caused by the impact of locally fired large caliber weapons. While 
the impact areas would be far from the reactor site, there would be a potential for system 
disruption from the repeated impacts of these systems.  The effect of these systems 
requires further study.   
 
The NRC also mandates an examination of the impact of airports, dams and significant 
transportation networks near the SMR site.  The m2Power concept houses reactor 
facilities below ground, which significantly minimizes the effects of an aircraft impact on 
the facility.  Much of the risk associated with these features can also be mitigated using 
procedural modifications.  Site selection on the installation will be the most important 
factor in risk mitigation.  Developers and military personnel will need to closely interface 
in order to minimize the risk.   Site developers must have a complete understanding of the 
military mission on the installation and work to minimize impacts while maximizing gain 
for the  
 
Manning	  and	  Management	  
 
Running the SMR facility requires a staff of highly trained personnel. The Department of 
Defense could opt train its own reactor operators as it did with the Army Nuclear Power 
Program (Appendix A). m2Power reactors offer a wide range of opportunities for the 
current force of DoD service members serving in a nuclear related field.   It would create 
the opportunity for the application of their skills in a joint billet. DoD may consider using 
naval reactor personnel as operators for the facility by rotating them through shore 
assignments.[57] This would provide naval personnel an opportunity to widen their 
technological expertise and become trained on the latest development in nuclear reactor 
systems.  Shore rotations would also provide naval personnel an assignment that serves as 
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a respite from deployments.  Additionally, other military branches have nuclear non-
proliferation experts within their ranks. The Army employs officers in the field called 
Functional Area 52, which is nuclear nonproliferation.  These officers could benefit from 
assignments with a military reactor team.  Not only could they improve their 
understanding of the nuclear power industry, they would be able to apply their non-
proliferation expertise to the facility. Health physics and radiation safety officers within 
the branches of service could gain valuable interdisciplinary experience by rotating 
through assignments at an m2Power facility.  
 
The Department of Defense could also contract reactor operation personnel from 
commercial organizations operating in the United States.  By doing this, DoD saves 
money on personnel costs and ensures that facility is maintained and operated by a staff 
that is already familiar with the industry.  Commercial nuclear power generation 
companies understand the licensing and training requirements unique to the nuclear 
industry.  They have established protocols and procedures to ensure regulatory 
compliance.  While the military has service members trained in the some fields of the 
nuclear industry, their expertise is not in land based plant operations.  A contract team 
brings a level of operational experience and expertise to the program that would take 
many years to grown internally within the military. 
 
 
Figure 33: Nuclear Energy Workers From Duke Energy[63] 
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Contract development would need to consider the complexity of nuclear power plant 
management when setting contract timelines.  The contract would need to offer the 
awarded company stability in its position.  The management and operation of a complex 
reactor facility requires an extensive investment in the hiring and training of personnel.  
A company cannot afford to invest such a commitment unless the contact guarantees 
operation of the facility for an extended period of time.  To ensure contract performance, 
DoD could place military representatives imbedded in the operations and management of 
the facility. This is achievable by rotating military officers within the nuclear fields 
through the facility for short-term assignments.  These personnel could not only aid in the 
operation of the reactor but also act as military technical advisors to the installation 
commander.   These officers have the military expertise needed to understand the impact 
of a reactor on installation operations.  They would be able to provide honest and open 
evaluations of the work conducted by the contracted reactor operator and aid in the 
procurement of further resources for the facility.   
 
Contract discussions must also involve the delineation of liability.  The installation 
commander is responsible for all actives on the base.  The reactor operator however, 
should be held liable for accidents caused by mismanagement or operational errors.  
Responsibility for shutdown, decommissioning, cleanup and disposal of the facility 
would be that of the Defense Department.  Discussions about liability and responsibilities 
must be included in the reactor development plan.   
Transportation	  
 
Military installations are well equipped to handle the transportation requirements of 
moving nuclear fuel and equipment. Installations are usually accessible by both highway 
and railroad.  Military units use rail facilities to load and unload military equipment for 
transportation to support operations all over the world.  Installations are equipped with 
loading yards for trucks to upload and download cargo. They have specialized equipment 
designed to move and lift heavy equipment from the trucks.  Some installations are 
equipped with runways capable of supporting the worlds largest transport planes.  
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Military planners are familiar with transporting equipment that is unusual in size and 
sensitive in nature.   
 
 
Figure 34: Fuel Casks Being Shipped By Rail[30] 
 
Accident considerations must be examined when analyzing the transportation of fuel to 
the SMR facility.  Much of the impact of this kind of accident can be mitigate through 
route selection.  Fuel transportation will require increased security to it would be ideal to 
conduct the operation during a period of low activity on the installation. Any lifting or 
delicate movement of nuclear fuel casks should be done as near to the reactor facility as 
possible.  Nuclear fuel shipping casks are very robust but in the event of an accident, the 
installation needs to have a procedure in place ensure the incident site is secure until 
clean up is complete.  Military personnel are familiar with the movement of sensitive 
equipment.  They will be able to develop movement protocols for nuclear materials into 
their standing operating procedures.     
Spent	  Fuel	  Management	  
 
Currently in the United States, spent nuclear fuel is being stored on site at commercial 
facilities.  In August of 2013, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the NRC to 
resume work on the geological repository Yucca Mountain. [64] There is still much 
debate about the repository and funding the project.  Until the debate surrounding the 
America’s geological repository results in a solution, spent fuel will continue to be stored 
on site at reactor facilities.   
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January 2012, The Blue Ribbon Commission released the results of its study on 
managing nuclear waste in the United States.  It recommends the consolidated storage of 
spent nuclear fuel rather than the current method which stores fuel on site at reactors all 
across the country.[30] It is conceivable that a storage consolation plan could be 
developed in future years.  Additionally, the possibility of another geologically repository 
besides Yucca Mountain is likely.  
 
 
Figure 35: Dry Cask Storage for Spent Fuel[30] 
 
 For a single reactor project, DoD will more than likely store the spent fuel on site.  As it 
develops multiple reactors, DoD might consider developing its own consolidated spent 
fuel storage location. As advanced reactor technology improves, spent DoD m2Power 
fuel might prove useful as fuel source for new reactor designs. A consolidated storage 
location for all DoD fuel would be ideal for siting an advanced reactor like PRISM, 
which could be used to recycle nuclear fuel. The technology has many years to mature 
but it is in planning now that DoD prepares for the future.  
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Chapter	  9:	  	  Implementation	  Strategy	  Building	  From	  a	  Proven	  
Concept	  
 
Taking a conceptual design from graph paper to reality is one of the hardest tasks in 
engineering.  Even known technology takes years to develop, resource, plan, and 
construct.  In choosing the m2Power reactor, DoD’s use of a tested reactor technology 
rather than starting from the conceptual beginning speeds its implementation.  The 
m2Power reactor utilizes technology that has extensive testing, evaluation and proof of 
concept in the basic design of LWR technology.  The application of LWR technology to 
smaller reactors is a new aspect of the design, which needs validation.  DoD capitalizes 
on the research being done B&W, TVA, the NRC and the Department of Energy in that it 
will not need to recreate the their efforts.  Those organizations will use their time, 
resources and expertise to test, validate and improve the mPower design and SMR 
commercial power concept.   
 
The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is a tool that helps DoD evaluate, rank and 
prioritize the developmental needs of the m2Power reactor.[65] Table 8 summarizes the 
TRLs for the m2Power reactor.[66] The table compares the TRL posture of the Clinch 
River Project and a DoD m2Power reactor. DoD benefits from the use of previous 
research and development from the Clinch River program. The table shows the TRL 
levels for a m2Power reactor used for electrical and cogeneration purposes. The analysis 
is color coded to indicate the progress made toward accomplishing each TRL.  
 
DoD benefits significantly from the work being done on the Clinch River Project as it not 
only validates the technology but also helps establish the SMR regulatory framework 
with the NRC.  DoD would need to conduct assessments independent of the Clinch River 
project beginning at TRL 7 as it moved the reactor into an operational environment. At 
that point, the impacts of siting a reactor on a military installation would need special 
consideration by both the NRC and the armed services.  A full analysis of the TRL 
assessment can be found in Appendix C. 
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Table 8: Technology Readiness Assessment for mPower use on DoD Installation 
 
 
 
TRL Definition Clinch/River/Project DoD//Power DoD/CHP
1 Basic&principles&observed&
and&reported Complete
B&W&Work,&
Complete
&Complete
2 Technology&concept&
and/or&application&
formulated
Complete B&W&Work,&Complete
Past&Analysis&
Review/Update
3 Analytical&and&experimental&critical&
function&and/or&
characteristic&proof&of&
concept
Complete B&W&Work,&Complete
Past&Analysis&
Review/Update
4 Component&and/or&breadboard&validation&in&
a&laboratory&
environment
Complete B&W&Work,&Complete
5 Component&and/or&breadboard&validation&in&
a&relevant&environment
Complete B&W&Work,&Complete
6 System/subsystem&model&or&prototype&
demonstration&in&a&
relevant&environment
Operating&Since&July&
2012,&In&Progress
7 System&prototype&demonstration&in&an&
operational&
environment.
InLProgress
8 Actual&system&completed&and&qualified&through&
test&and&demonstration.
InLProgress
9 Actual&system&proven&through&successful&
mission&operations.
InLProgress
DoD/Technology/Readiness/Levels
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The	  Collaborative	  Team	  
 
One of the most challenge aspects of project management is the development and control 
of the collaborative team.  It is important to keep each team member fully engaged. Tasks 
and responsibilities must be divided in such a manner that best capitalizes on the 
collective expertise.  It is incredibly challenging to provide oversight of large numbers of 
contracts and ensure that each contractor provides high quality work. [65] The 
Department of Defense runs some of the largest project management operations in the 
world. Projects range from simple lawn care operations to troop food preparation in chow 
halls to the development, testing and fielding new fighter jets.   
 
In the collaborative team for the development of an SMR, DoD will need to extend 
contractual relationships into the nuclear industry.  The Department of Defense has 
contractual relationships with reactor manufacturers supporting nuclear navy operations 
as well as government organizations.  Defense personnel work closely with DoE and the 
NNSA to manage the nuclear fuel supplies for naval vessels. The protocols and 
relationships defined to support the nuclear navy will be helpful in defining a framework 
of procedures for land based reactor operations. During the early years of Army Nuclear 
Power Program, there was confusion around the overall control of the project.  The first 
reactor, SM-1 at Ft. Belvoir VA, was developed in a disjointed manner that loosely 
aligned the Atomic Energy Commission, the Army Corps of Engineers and the reactor 
contractor.  The result was overlapping responsibilities as well as gaps in task 
completion.  The Army learned from this project and streamlined all operations under the 
Army Corps of Engineers for further reactor projects.  Having a single project 
management office for the development of an m2Power reactor will aid in streamlining 
the collaborative efforts of the team.  
Program	  Organization	  
 
A land based m2Power project would be a Department of Defense level operation. DoD 
would need to establish a centralized program office to manage the collaborative team as 
no such structure exists within the organization today.   The m2Power Nuclear Program 
Office would be the office responsible for the overall project management of siting, 
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licensing and constructing an m2Power facility. Figure 35 shows a simplified 
organizational chart that illustrates just a few of collaborative team members under to 
m2Power Nuclear Program Office.  As the project grows, this organizational chart will 
increase in complexity. 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Nuclear Power Program Office Oragnaztional Chart 
 
The expertise in land reactor operations exists outside the Department of Defense.  
Coordination with these experts is vital to the success of the project. There will be 
extensive coordination with other government agencies. Defense officials will need to 
coordinate closely with Department of Energy as it is the government leader in the 
development of energy systems and is at the forefront of SMR development.  The NNSA 
will need to be included as DoD develops a fuel cycle plan for sustaining the reactor.  
DoE laboratories play a key role in the research of new energy technology.  While there 
is no need for the development of new technology in an m2Power reactor, the impacts of 
putting a nuclear reactor on a military installation need further study.  DoE employs the 
experts capable of making independent, unbiased analysis of siting SMRs on military 
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installations. DoE laboratories will also be able to aid the Department of Defense in 
finding the most environmentally suited installation for siting a m2Power reactor.  
 
The NRC will want to examine licensing changes associated with putting the reactor on a 
military installation. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will need to be 
included in the assessment of environmental impacts of the reactor on the military 
installation environment as well as that of the surrounding comminutes. Military 
installations already have unique environmental impacts to their surroundings.  
Evaluations of environmental impacts from the installations would need to be updated to 
include nuclear operations.  
 
Defense officials will play a pivotal role in assessing which installations are suited for 
nuclear power.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand the missions of each of their 
installations and would be best suited to analyze the impact of nuclear reactor technology 
on their base.  Personnel management is controlled at the individual branch level.  Joint 
military personnel analysis would need to be conducted at interdepartmental levels in 
order to best understand the talents of the nuclear personnel within each branch. From 
this assessment, the m2Power Nuclear Program Office could develop a manning 
methodology that utilizes current DoD personnel and provides opportunities to enhance 
organic nuclear professional development without sacrificing mission performance within 
the branches.  Each branch of the military handles construction projects through their 
own organizations. The Army uses the Army Corps of engineers.  The Air Force utilizes 
Air Force civil engineers.  Once an installation is determined to be a suitable prototype 
installation for the first m2Power facility, the program office will work closely with those 
engineers as well as the installation management commanders. 
 
Non-governmental organizations will also work with the m2Power Nuclear Program 
Office.  Reactor designers from B&W will need to re-validate design criteria taking into 
considerations any impact from military installation siting.  The reactor operator chosen 
to run the facility will need to not only be aware of reactor operations but also understand 
its interface with the military installation it services. The NRC analysis will need to come 
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from the m2Power reactor team so an expert on licensing SMRs will be needed.  This 
could possibly be internal to B&W or perhaps come from one of the TVA experts on the 
Clinch River Project.   
 
Financing	  Considerations	  
 
Financing the costs of large projects is a complicated process.  DoD funds many of its 
acquisition projects through direct appropriation of funds over a given number of years.  
A project of this size would require large amounts of funding but it is not on a scale 
unfamiliar to DoD. Additionally, much of the expense which goes into developing “first 
of a kind” technology has already been covered by DoE as it works in collaboration with 
B&W and TVA.  DoD would need to source funding for military specific site 
assessments.  Funding is available under current budgets for renewable energy projects. 
Funding for any reactor modification to meet military installation needs could be jointly 
shared through the Departments of Energy and Defense.  
 
Construction and operation costs could be handled in a similar manner as current 
renewable energy projects.  Conservation and renewable energy performance contracts 
allow developers to be paid from the savings or revenues made through conservation or 
energy generation.  In a similar way, a developer undertaking the m2Power project could 
be paid by the power generated for the military. Because nuclear facilities have extremely 
long life spans, a utility company would be guaranteed an excellent source of long term 
revenue once initial expenses are repaid.  Additionally, the provider would be alleviated 
of all fuel procurement, storage and decommissioning costs, as DoD would assume these 
responsibilities.  This kind of arrangement drastically reduces the overhead cost for the 
developer.  Finally, if the base fails to use all this power generated, a utility company 
could be further incentivized through having the latitude to sell excess power to other 
customers.   
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Chapter	  10:	  Conclusion	  and	  Summary	  
 
In an effort to improve its energy security, DoD has linked energy security to its efforts to 
reduce climate change.  Many of the measures undertaken by the Department are 
performing well.  DoD investments on conservation efforts have resulted in a much more 
efficient use of facility energy on its installations.  New buildings begin construction with 
a target goal of being functional as well as being energy efficient.  Old buildings receive 
many upgrades, which help minimize the waste of heating or cooling resources.  The 
Department is actively monitoring its real property to try and identify areas where energy 
waste can be minimized.   
 
Despite the increases in energy efficiency, DoD is failing to secure its future.  By 
focusing solely on a limited definition of renewable technology, DoD power production 
does not provide it with a sustainable power source.  The current renewable energy 
sources used by DoD are inefficient, low production methods that are susceptible to 
seasonal fluctuations.  Renewable technologies do not produce the power outputs needed 
to sustain the large, technology driven operations of a modern military.  These sources 
leave an installation tethered to an external civilian power network.  
 
By looking to the nuclear industry, the Department of Defense finds a renewable, 
sustainable solution to its energy security.  Nuclear fuel is the most powerful source of 
energy on the planet.  It emits no harmful greenhouse gases.  It has a proven history of 
reliability within the United States commercial and defense sectors.  It can be recycled 
into new fuel for existing facilities.  Nuclear energy offers DoD a sustainable energy 
source that not only meets its large energy demand, but also preserves America’s natural 
and man-made resources for many generations.  As in the middle of the 20th century, 
DoD must make a technological leap in order to fulfill its security mission for the citizens 
it serves. 
 
The B&W mPower reactor is currently the most technologically adaptable reactor for use 
on a military installation.  It produces the power output needed to sustain all installation 
energy needs.  It produces abundant electrical power.  It can also be used for 
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cogeneration to produce power or process heat. Process heat applications include base 
heating or water procurement. The mPower timeline to commercialization makes it a 
solution DoD can recognize in the near future.   
 
In applying the m2Power reactor to a military installation there are some unique 
considerations that differentiate it from the commercial product.  The most important 
consideration is the impact of the reactor on the mission of the installation.  A support 
system such as a power facility, water treatment plan or garbage disposal plant cannot 
interfere with base operations. The commander of an installation must have the freedom 
to execute military training with minimal interference from the facility.  The size of an 
m2Power facility make it ideally suited for reduced impact on military installation 
operations.  Placement of the m2Power facility on the installation will be dictated by how 
it impacts military operations. Commanders will have a reliable source of power with 
minimal intrusion.  Additionally, the installation offers added security for the power 
facility by utilizing established military security protocols.  Many installations are in 
remote locations that present a viable option for national spent fuel consolidation 
program. The military has many nuclear trained personnel who can aid in the operation 
and management of an m2Power facility.   
 
The Babcock and Wilcox mPower small modular nuclear reactor offers the Department 
of Defense the technical paradigm shift needed to secure its installation energy future.  
By looking at the current energy strategy of the Department of Defense, it is clear that 
DoD does not have a sustainable energy solution.  While its reduction initiatives are 
effectively optimizing energy demand, its production measures are woefully lacking in 
output.  A shift to sustainable, nuclear power secures DoD’s energy future.  With a 
careful understanding of military operations, the placement of an m2Power facility on an 
installation will provide it sustainable, clean energy for many years.  To confront the 
advanced threats facing the Nation today, the Department of Defense needs a robust, 
technical response.  Nuclear energy provided a revolutionary change in the Cold War of 
the 20th century and is postured to provide that same change in the conflicts of the 21st 
century.    
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Appendix	  A:	  Army	  Nuclear	  Power	  Program	  
 
The Army first investigated using nuclear power to provide electricity and heat to 
military installations in the 1950s.  Observing success within the Navy and its campaign 
to power submarines with nuclear power, Army leadership wondered if this new 
technology could be useful to power some of their remote out stations or even be made 
into a portable power source.  An initial studied conducted by Dr. Lawrence Hafstad of 
the AEC working at ORNL concluded that it was feasible for a small scale nuclear 
reactor to be used to power a military installation. 
 
The Army Nuclear Power Program began in 1953 with a joint partnership between the 
Army Corps of Engineers and Atomic Energy Commission. Heading the program was 
Col. James B. Lampert.  Much of the initial work in establishing the program revolved 
around the allocation of responsibility for cost of construction. The AEC and DOD 
created a detailed contract that outlined which portions of a proposed plant would be 
funding by each department. Eventually the decision was made that the AEC would 
construct the nuclear power portion of the plant and the Army Corps of Engineers would 
construct the traditional power generation station.  There were specific contractual 
provisions about the fuel transfers and costs associated with fabrication and reprocessing.  
On July 21, 1954 the final proposed joint funding contract was approved and by 
December the program had contracted ALCO (American Locomotive Company) to 
construct the plant. 
 
The Army Nuclear Power division quickly realized that it would need a prototype reactor 
site from which they could test the technology and train personnel before it started 
putting reactors in remote locations. The first reactor built was SM-1 at Ft. Belvoir VA.  
The reactor was a 10MWth pressurized water reactor.  SM-1 had 38 fuel elements and 7 
control rods.  On April 8, 1957 it achieved criticality.  It began its 700-hour load testing 
on June 2, 1957 and successfully operated at varying loads form 10% to 100% being shut 
down for only 7 hours and 28 minutes to install testing instrumentation.  The facility 
became fully operational in 1958 and ran for 16 years without accident. While 
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constructing SM-1, the Army Nuclear Power division realized that significant training 
was required for individuals to work on these sites.  SM-1 became not only the prototype 
reactor but also the training facility.  Individuals selected to work in power production 
underwent training from the University of Virginia, Pennsylvania State and University of 
California Berkley. They received instruction from equipment manufactures as well.  
Men were chosen from the Army Signal Corps and the Army Corps of Engineers. They 
were expected to have a master’s degree in nuclear engineering or some closely related 
field.  
 
While the project in VA was underway, the Col Lampert began planning and developing 
the first remote power station at Ft. Greely, AK.  This station had extreme environmental 
temperature variations as well as the challenge of being very remote.  The purpose of this 
station would be to test the feasibility of using a reactor in arctic conditions.  After a long 
and challenging funding validation process SM-1A was approved for development in 
Alaska. Learning from the challenges of the SM-1 contact, this project was entirely 
managed by the Army Corps of Engineers.  The Corps of Engineers contacted Kiewit 
Construction to build the reactor facility.  SM-1A was different from its predecessor in 
hat it was a true combined heat and power facility.  Half of the energy it created was used 
to generate steam for power generation and the other half was used for installation 
heating.  Additionally, the cooling water for this location came from deep wells rather 
than a river such as SM-1’s use of the Potomac. Plagued by delays and faulty 
instrumentation, SM-1A went critical on March 13, 1962. Over the next two years of 
testing, the plant faced many minor challenges resulting in a difficult testing process.  On 
August 9, 1964, SM-1A became fully operational and went on to set the record for 
continuous operations by a military reactor facility of 2750 hours.  SM-1A proved that 
reactor technology could be used in remote and austere locations to provided combined 
heat and power to an installation. 
 
The Army Nuclear Reactor Program reached its peak in early 1960s.  At the height of the 
program, there were a number of reactors operating independently in remote locations. 
PM-2A was located at Camp Century in the inland of Greenland.  This plant was unique 
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in that it was designed to be portable.  Many portions of it were shipped via air straight 
into Camp Century while the nuclear power portion was moved via ship.  After 
installation in 1962, the plant ran for a few short months.  Due to a reduction in the 
mission at Camp Century, it was no longer needed and subsequently disassembled and 
shipped back to the United States. It demonstrated not only functionality in an austere 
environment but showed that the reactor system was truly portable.  Other portable 
reactors included PM-1, which ran a radar site in Sundance Wyoming.  PM-1 provided 
heat and power to the radar facility operated by NORAD.  PM-3A operated at a Naval 
land station in McMurdo Sound Antarctica.  Despite the logistical and environmental 
challenges associated with operation in Antarctica, this reactor facility successfully 
provided power to 150 personnel for 11 years.  It was decommissioned in 1972.  
 
Other innovative designs came from the program.  The Army Transportation Corps 
explored the idea of the Military Compact Reactor (MCR) that could power a vehicle or a 
train.  The ML-1 project was a portable gas cooled reactor that could be loaded on a truck 
or barge or train and sent forward with deployed troops.  ML-1 was actually built and 
operated in Idaho and was unique to the military because it was the first gas-cooled 
reactor.  MH-1A was a floating nuclear reactor mounted on a barge named Sturgis.  The 
Sturgis was specially built and designed to carry the reactor.  MH-1A went critical on 
January 24, 1967 while docked at Ft Belvoir.  It was operated by an engineer detachment 
and provided power to the base.  The state department eventually entered into a contract 
with the State of Panama to use the Sturgis to power the Panama Canal Zone.  The boat 
was towed to Panama in 1968 and moored with the hydroelectric station. Once hooked 
into the station, the boat provided power to the Canal Zone for 8 years.  The Sturgis was 
returned to the United States in 1977 following negations concerning about ownership of 
the Canal Zone.  It was decommissioned and put into anchorage in 1978.  
 
The first signs of program decline following an accident at reactor facility SL-1 located in 
Idaho.  This was the first boiling water reactor used by the military.  After testing, SL-1 
operated successfully for two years and was used to conduct training for military crews 
on a boiling water plant.  On December 23, 1960, the facility was shutdown for routine 
maintenance. During maintenance, it is theorized that one of the reactor operators moved 
 101 
a central control rod too quickly causing prompt criticality, instantaneous superheating of 
the core water and vaporization to steam.  The massive pressure caused an explosion and 
killed three operators.  No radioactive material leaked from the facility.  Many lessons 
were learned about operating procedures and BWR design following the accident. 
Nevertheless, the accident was a significant blemish on the record of the nuclear power 
program.  
 
Despite running many successful reactors and demonstrating their functionality in remote 
in austere locations, funding constraints at the end of the 1960s caused a reexamination of 
the Army Nuclear Power Program.  In the late 60s, the Vietnam War began to 
significantly affect DoD’s budget.  Military leaders looked for places to make cuts in 
spending.  Analysis of the Army Nuclear Power Program showed that it was not cost 
effective to build such expensive projects in support of remote locations, many of which 
only had operating missions of a few years.  The Army sought to define the requirements 
for the program but in light of the competing costs of the Vietnam war it was determined 
that remote stations could still be powered more cheaply by diesel fuel.  SM-1 never 
produced electricity at a rate that was cheaper than the base could have purchased it from 
the local utility.  Thus the Army cut funding to the research and development portion of 
the Army Nuclear Program.  By 1975 all reactors had been deactivated with the 
exception of the Sturgis and the program had transitioned to the Engineer Power Group 
focused on storing and maintaining non-tactical generators on installations.  The group 
restructured again in 1977 and assumed responsibility of installation maintenance and 
remote power procurement.  By the 1980s, the Engineer Power Group had turned its 
focus entirely to the maintenance of installation facilities such as the maintenance and 
repair of real property, construction, fire prevention systems and environmental 
controls.[67]  
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Appendix	  B:	  SMR	  Design	  Assessments	  
mPower	  
B.1 Safety: The mPower reactor incorporates the latest passive and active safety features 
into its small, LWR design.  Of primary consideration is potential damaged caused by a 
loss of coolant scenario.  The mPower reactor reduces the risk of this accident by keeping 
all coolant within a single vessel.  The reactor facility contains on-site storage of 
supplemental water than can provide cooling for a minimum of 7 days.  Many of the 
reactor controls have passive redundancies in the event of a power loss.  The facility itself 
is seismically hardened as well as resistant to flooding. The LWR technology is proven 
and well tested. Designers’ depth of knowledge and practical experience with these types 
of reactors allows for a much more complete understanding of potential accident 
scenarios than then more experimental reactor designs.  
 
B.2 Power Output: The mPower reactor has a power output of 155 MWe or 530 MWth.  
This size of reactor adequately meets the needs of a DoD installation with one module.  
There is enough energy generated to be both a source of electricity as well as being used 
for process heat applications like district heating.   
 
B.3 Physical Size: A two-module facility with a spent fuel storage pond occupies a 40-
acre site.  The anticipated exclusion zone is less than a mile.   
 
B.4 Refueling Cycle: The mPower reactor runs for 4 years at 95% capacity before 
requiring refuel.  A two-module system could operate on offset refueling intervals so as 
to always provide constant power to an installation.  Two modules would generate an 
excess amount of power for a typical installation.  A one-module facility could be 
operated at less than 95% to increase refueling intervals.  An installation could use 
civilian power during times of refueling.  Potentially this could be at no cost if DoD 
could earn credit by supplying the civilian provider with excess power during times of 
normal operations.  Modifications to the fuel configuration could also increase the time 
between refuel operations.   
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B.5 Licensing: The mPower reactor closely resembles the LWR models used by the NRC 
under its current regulatory framework. TVA plants to use the mPower reactor at its new 
SMR facility under development at Clinch River.  TVA’s Clinch River project is 
presenting the NRC with its first SMR licensing test. In evaluating the Clinch River 
project, the NRC must not only license a new reactor design but also it must also look at 
the project from a new perspective. TVA is planning to install mPower modules, which 
currently are still in need of design certification from the NRC. The siting of the mPower 
units and how they will be implemented over time require not only forethought on the 
part of TVA, but also require flexibility in regulation from the NRC to make the project 
economical. It is unreasonable for TVA to have to readdress all regulatory requirements 
for every additional mPower module they add to the site.  TVA must forecast facility 
impacts on the environment and conduct accident analysis assuming the facility is 
operating at its largest planned capacity.  The NRC should be flexible and allow TVA to 
implement its mPower installation timeline freely as long as it stays within its forecast 
capacity.  
 
B.6 Public Acceptance: The LWR design is the reactor design most easily accepted by 
the public.  It is not a large divergence from currently used reactor technology and 
mPower can boast of many new safety features that differentiate it from the more 
troubled reactors like Fukushima.  Additionally, mPower has an edge over other SMR 
technologies as TVA constructs a first of its kind facility using mPower near future at 
Clinch River.  An operating reactor facility will provide the public comfort by knowing 
that other commercial manufactures are using it and the military installation is not being 
used to test new technology. 
 
B.7 Fuel Cost: The mPower reactor uses standard LWR fuel.  No special fabrication 
facilities are needed to provide fuel for the reactor.  Current fuel cycle processes would 
be capable of sustaining this reactor.  
 
B.8 Maturity of Technology: LWR technology is the most widely used reactor 
technology.  mPower incorporates many new safety features and design changes however 
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the basic technology remains unchanged.  Due to the mature nature of the technology, 
LWR designs are the quickest to be implemented for military use.  They require very 
little further testing of reactor components or systems. mPower has a test reactor, which it 
operates, and might soon have the first commercial designs used for power production.  
 
B.6 Process Heat Applications: The mPower reactor produces thermal energy at 
temperatures high enough to provide district heating as well as nuclear desalination.  It 
could be used for limited chemical production applications as well.  The single reactor 
produces enough energy to be used as a cogeneration facility to combine electrical 
production as well as some process heat applications.[42]   
 
NuScale	  
B.1 Safety: The NuScale reactor takes advantage of natural circulation to sustain coolant 
flow within its system.  Natural circulation is advantageous as it operates both actively 
and passively.  It has a number of redundant decay heat removal systems (DHRS and 
ECCS) as well as being situated within a pond of cooling water.  The reactor facility is 
located below ground and is hardened against natural disasters. The NuScale design 
incorporates spent fuel storage cooling into its plant safety analysis.  The spent fuel pool 
has a cooling capacity with the water volume necessary to accommodate high or low 
density fuel racks. It has an additional water supply that can be activated by reactor 
personnel in safe locations.  The NuScale design incorporates an active refuel operation.  
Refueling operations are conducted at the same time the facility produces power.  While 
this is economical advantageous, it does induce risk in the form of operational and 
process errors.  These errors are compounded in severity as the other reactor modules 
could be operating at the time of an accident. Extensive risk analysis is needed to identify 
the risks during refuel operations as well as the adoption of strict refuel procedures and 
protocols.   Many of the NuScale safety features are in direct response to the Fukushima 
accident.  These features allow designs to directly answer Fukushima safety questions 
from critics as well as comply with new NRC guidance.   
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B.2 Power Output: The NuScale reactor outputs 45 MWe or 160 MWth.  The reactor 
output is small but it intended to be operated in a multi-module facility.  A DoD 
installation would need 2-3 reactors to meet its basic electrical needs.  If it wanted to 
conduct process heat applications, it would need additional modules. The small output of 
the modules allows DoD to tailor each facility to the installation.   
 
B.3 Physical Size: A 12-module facility with a spent fuel storage pond occupies a 44-
acre site.  The anticipated exclusion zone is much smaller than current commercial 
reactors.  
 
B.4 Refueling Cycle: The NuScale module requires refueling every 2 years.  For a 12 
module facility, this means refueling a module every 2 months.  Facility operators would 
undergo refuel operations on a constant schedule.  For a facility with fewer modules, the 
refueling intervals would be easier to offset. For DoD, a 3 to 4 module facility would 
require one module refueled every 6 months.  During times of refuel, consideration must 
be given to the reduced power capacity of the facility.  It may be necessary to increase the 
number of modules to account for refuel outages.  
 
B.5 Licensing: NuScale is part of a DoE partnership to enhance the use of SMR 
technology.  NuScale began its pre-application in 2008 and is expected to have design 
certification from the NRC in 2015. [68]While it is slightly behind mPower on the 
licensing timeline, it benefits from the development of regulatory framework that is 
developing around mPower.  The reactor technology is not drastically different than a 
LWR so licensing questions will revolve mostly around the SMR framework and 
individual technologies.   
 
B.6 Public Acceptance: The LWR design is the reactor design most easily accepted by 
the public.  It is not a large divergence from currently used reactor technology and 
mPower can boast of many new safety features that differentiate it from the more 
troubled reactors like Fukushima.  NuScale has safety features that can are designed to be 
in direct response to the Fukushima accident.  These features will aid developers by 
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increasing public confidence in the design as they point out its key safety differences 
from the troubled reactor.  Additionally, similar SMR technology is being implemented 
commercially at Clinch River.  An operating commercial reactor with a similar design 
will provide the public comfort by knowing that the military installation is not being used 
to test new, unproven technology. 
B.7 Fuel Cost: The NuScale reactor uses standard LWR fuel.  No special fabrication 
facilities are needed to provide fuel for the reactor.  Current fuel cycle processes would 
be capable of sustaining this reactor. 
 
B.8 Maturity of Technology: LWR technology is the most widely used reactor 
technology.  NuScale incorporates many new safety features and design changes however 
the basic technology remains unchanged.  Due to the mature nature of the technology, 
LWR designs are the quickest to be implemented for military use.  They require very 
little further testing of reactor components or systems. NuSclae has a prototype reactor 
used to test systems and controls of the individual module. They have yet to develop a 
full NuScale power generation facility.   
 
B.6 Process Heat Applications: The NuScale rector could be used for both district 
heating and nuclear desalination.  It is unlikely that it could be used for cogeneration 
while operating as a single module. Working in an array of modules, NuScale technology 
could be used to power a cogeneration facility.[36]   
 
PRISM	  
B.1 Safety: The use of sodium as a coolant provides both safety advantages and 
disadvantages.  Sodium coolant is operated under low pressure, which eliminates the loss 
of pressure accident within the core.  Sodium’s reactivity with water is risk unique to 
SFR.  Reactor designers mitigate this risk by using intermediate cooling loops to separate 
core coolant from steam production.  Leaks within sodium reactors can pose potential 
dangers as the coolant reacts with air or water.  Sodium cooled reactors have been 
operated and many have experienced small leaks which were easily contained.  There is a 
history of leak detection and isolation controls for the operation of SFR.  The PRISM 
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incorporates decay heat removal systems to passively remove heat from the core during 
normal or emergency shutdown. The Auxiliary Cooling System (ACS) removes heat 
from the vessel by using forced or natural circulation to pass air along the exterior of the 
reactor vessel. The Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) adds additional 
cooling air to the ACS using passive systems only.  Additionally, the RVACS provides 
protection to the reactor vessel in event of failure to a heat removal system as decay heat 
is transferred through the vessel to the surrounding containment.  The PRISM reactors are 
designed to be operated in a variety of configurations. The lack of uniformity presents an 
operational risk, as there is an increased potential for human induced errors, especially 
while simultaneously operating a number of PRISM reactors in different configurations.  
 
B.2 Power Output: The PRISM outputs 311 MWe or 840 MWth. This is more than 
enough to meet the needs of a DoD installation.  If operated as part of a waste 
management solution, it could provide power for the waste reprocessing as well as 
installation power.  Excess power could be sold to a local utility.   
 
B.3 Physical Size: PRISM reactors are part of the ARC solution to nuclear waste.  The 
anticipated ARC facility will be very large and is unlikely to be situated on a military 
compound.   
 
B.4 Refueling Cycle: The PRISM refuel cycle is 12- 24 months depending on fuel 
configuration for the mission of the PRISM.  The intent of the ARC facility is nuclear 
fuel reduction through re-use within a PRISM module.  Thus, increased refueling 
intervals aid ARC operators by providing increased opportunities to burn used nuclear 
fuel. 
 
B.5 Licensing: The PRISM reactor diverges greatly from the LWR framework used by 
the NRC. As an advanced reactor, there are many questions concerning the development 
of a licensing framework.  
 
 108 
B.6 Public Acceptance: The benefits of the sodium cooled, nuclear waste fueled PRISM 
present an attractive solution to the Nation’s nuclear waste challenges.  Using a reactor 
with the capacity to run on spent fuel would be certain to have strong public appeal.  The 
public might be concerned about the use of advanced reactor technology since it the 
project would be a first of its kind development.  The public would be more likely to 
accept the project if it was located far from population centers on a remote military 
installation.  This kind of implementation is likely to have strong approval as it not only 
presents a viable solution to nuclear waste disposal but it also keeps the reactor out of 
major population centers.  The public is likely to approve of its placement on a military 
installation as these facilities already have established security protocols.   
 
B.7 Fuel Cost: The PRISM reactor requires specific fuel in order to operate. It is 
indented to be coupled to a fuel-recycling center, which would accept and process nuclear 
waste.  The recycling center would then repackage the waste into useable fuel for the 
PRISM reactor.  Fuel manufacturing for the PRISM would be expensive however if 
coupled to a solution to the disposal of nuclear waste, might be an acceptable cost.  
Funding for a project of this scale requires cooperation of many departments within the 
government and is unlikely to be conducted solely by the Department of Defense.   
 
B.8 Maturity of Technology: Sodium cooled reactors have an extensive history of testing 
and operation.  They are not currently used in the United States.  The PRISM has a 
number to technological advances that require further testing and evaluation. A large 
component of this design is evaluating the fuel-recycling center.  This reactor is 
considered advanced and is still in the research and development stages of 
implementation.  
 
B.6 Process Heat Applications: While the PRISM reactor attains temperatures that could 
be used for process heat applications, its primary purpose is nuclear fuel recycling. It 
could be used however for nuclear desalination or district heating.  A fuel recycling 
facility located in a remote location could find some use in the application of excess 
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energy.   Process heat applications of thermal energy could be used for life support 
systems of the facility staff. [38]  
4S	  
B.1 Safety: The 4S reactor has the same advantages and disadvantages as the PRISM 
reactor due to using sodium as a coolant.  The 4S reactor incorporates a number of 
passive decay heat removal systems such as the IRACS and RVACS.  The 4S reactor is 
intended to be a stand-alone, minimum maintenance reactor.  By reducing the number of 
reactivity changes, reducing maintenance outages and eliminating refuel operations, the 
reactor has a reduced risk of procedural induced accidents (human error).  This 
operational approach does increase the risk from material failure induced accidents, as 
there is a reduced level of scheduled maintenance on the facility.  Proper risk analysis 
needs to be done to define material failure times.  The maintenance checks must then be 
conducted within appropriate time standards to prevent failures.  
 
B.2 Power Output: The 4S reactor produces 10 MWe.  This output will not sustain a 
large DoD installation. There are small, remote outstations however that could be 
sustained on 10 MWe.   
 
B.3 Physical Size: The 4S reactor is very small and intended for remote locations. It is 
well suited to fit in confined spaces, as it requires no storage for spent fuel.  Increasing 
the number of 4S modules would increase the land requirements however these modules 
are not intended to be operated collectively.   
 
B.4 Refueling Cycle: The 4S reactor has no refuel option. It runs for 30 years 
continuously and is then replaced. This significantly reduces fuel and operating costs.  
 
B.5 Licensing: The 4S reactor diverges greatly from the LWR framework used by the 
NRC. As an advanced reactor, there are many questions concerning the development of a 
licensing framework. 
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B.6 Public Acceptance: The 4S reactor is much smaller and longer lived than other SMR 
designs.  These characteristics make it uniquely suited for certain situations.  The public 
is likely to approve of a remote power, long-term power source like the 4S reactor if it is 
clearly tied to a solution for a challenging problem.  Most ideally it would be suited for 
providing power to locations within third world countries to sustain medical and foreign 
aid operations.  These locations face challenging security situations so its anti-
proliferation design features aid the reactor. Additionally the reactor requires very little 
active control so it does not need the typical large, well trained, expensive staff found in a 
commercial facility. The public is likely to accept this reactor abroad and could be used 
by the military on small installations outside the United States.  It could also be used at 
small remote sites within the US.   Within the country, the public might be concerned 
about the minimal staffing requirements as well as the first of its kind technology.   
 
B.7 Fuel Cost: The 4s reactor uses a uniquely designed fuel pin with a glass plenum 
running along het center axis of the pin.  It is a unique design and would require 
specialized fabrication.  While this would be more costly than standard LWR fuel, it is 
also a one-time expense.  The reactor runs for 30 years without the need for refueling.  
The longevity of the fuel cycle offsets the expense of the fuel.   
 
B.8 Maturity of Technology: Sodium cooled reactors have an extensive history of testing 
and operation.  They are not currently used in the United States.  The 4S reactor has a 
number to technological advances that require further testing and evaluation. Further 
research is needed for both material and fuel pin design.  This reactor is considered 
advanced and is still in the research and development stages of implementation. 
 
B.6 Process Heat Applications: The 4S reactor does not produced enough energy to 
provide both process heat and electricity. It is possible it could be used for process heat 
applications in stand-alone facilities on a small scale.[39]   
Reactor	  Assessment	  
The reactors are ranked on a scale of 1 through 4.  A score of 1 is given the reactor with 
the best characteristics to meet the design consideration.  All characteristics are equally 
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weighted.  Each subsequent reactor is ranked numerically.  The reactor with the lowest 
total score is the one that meets the current design needs of the Department of Defense 
for providing installation energy security.  This assessment shows that the mPower 
reactor is most suited for powering a DoD installation.  
 
 
 
 	  
Reactor mPower NuScale PRISM 4S
Safety 3 2 4 1
Power/Output 1 2 3 4
Physical/Size 2 3 4 1
Refueling/Cycle 2 3 4 1
Licensing 1 2 4 3
Public/
Acceptance
1 2 4 3
Fuel/Costs 1 2 4 3
Maturity/of/
Technology
1 2 4 3
Process/Heat/
Applications
1 3 2 4
Score 13 21 33 23
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Appendix	  C:	  Technology	  Readiness	  Assessment	  for	  DoD	  Power	  Reactor	  and	  
Combined	  Heat	  and	  Power	  Facility	  
This table was prepared using the 2011 Department of Defense Technology Readiness 
Level Assessment Guidebook.[66] 
 
  
TRL Definition Description Clinch2River2Project DoD22Power DoD2CHP
1
Basic&principles&observed&
and&reported
Lowest&level&of&technology&readiness.&
Scientific&research&begins&to&be&
translated&into&applied&research&and&
development&(R&D).&Examples&might&
include&paper&studies&of&a&technology’s&
basic&properties.
No&changes&to&basic&science&from&
LWR&concepts
No&action&needed No&action&needed
2
Technology&concept&
and/or&application&
formulated
Invention&begins.&Once&basic&principles&
are&observed,&practical&applications&can&
be&invented.&Applications&are&
speculative,&and&there&may&be&no&proof&
or&detailed&analysis&to&support&the&
assumptions.&Examples&are&limited&to&
analytic&studies.
Development&of&improved&safety&
features,&both&passive&and&active.&
Small,&self&contained&reactor&
conceptualized
No&action&needed& No&action&needed&for&reactor&
technology.&Analysis&of&
cogeneration&
demands/applications
3
Analytical&and&
experimental&critical&
function&and/or&
characteristic&proof&of&
concept
Active&R&D&is&initiated.&This&includes&
analytical&studies&and&laboratory&studies&
to&physically&validate&the&analytical&
predictions&of&separate&elements&of&the&
technology.&Examples&include&
components&that&are&not&yet&integrated&
or&representative
Analysis&and&modeling&of&passive&
safety&features&and&controls&
unique&to&mPower&reactor.&
Simulations&of&balance&of&plant
No&action&needed No&action&need&on&new&reactor&
design.&&Analysis&of&cogeneration&
options/balance&of&plant&utilizing&
lessons&learned&from&Army&
Nuclear&Power&Program
4
Component&and/or&
breadboard&validation&in&
a&laboratory&
environment
Basic&technological&components&are&
integrated&to&establish&that&they&will&
work&together.&This&is&relatively&“low&
fidelity”&compared&with&the&eventual&
system.&Examples&include&integration&of&
“ad&hoc”&hardware&in&the&laboratory.
Individual&safety&system&
development,&testing&and&
modeling.&Laboratory&models&of&
controls&and&safety&features
No&action&needed No&action&needed&for&reactor&
technology.&Cogeneration&
technology&components&tested&
(controls,&valves,&load&shedding,&
distribution)
5
Component&and/or&
breadboard&validation&in&
a&relevant&environment
Fidelity&of&breadboard&technology&
increases&significantly.&The&basic&
technological&components&are&integrated&
with&reasonably&realistic&supporting&
elements&so&they&can&be&tested&in&a&
simulated&environment.&Examples&
include&“highSfidelity”&laboratory&
integration&of&components
Newly&development&components&
tested&in&controlled&reactor&
environment&or&test&facility.&&
No&action&needed Cogeneration&technology&applied&
to&existing&test&reactor&facility.&&
Reactor/process&heat&interface&
validated
6
System/subsystem&
model&or&prototype&
demonstration&in&a&
relevant&environment
Representative&model&or&prototype&
system,&which&is&well&beyond&that&of&TRL&
5,&is&tested&in&a&relevant&environment.&
Represents&a&major&step&up&in&a&
technology’s&laboratory&environment&or&
in&a&simulated&operational&environment&
demonstrated&readiness.&Examples&
include&testing&a&prototype&in&a&highS
fidelity
Reactor&prototype&built&and&
operated&in&controlled&
environment.&B&W&Integrated&
System&Test&Facility&(fully&
operational&July&2012)
No&action&needed Existing&prototype&facility&
coupled&to&process&heat&
application.&Verification&of&
reactor/process&heat&interface.&
Validation&of&all&reactor&
control/safety&features.&Process&
heat&output&confirmed
7
System&prototype&
demonstration&in&an&
operational&
environment.
Prototype&near&or&at&planned&operational&
system.&Represents&a&major&step&up&from&
TRL&6&by&requiring&demonstration&of&an&
actual&system&prototype&in&an&
operational&environment&(e.g.,&in&an&airS
craft,&in&a&vehicle,&or&in&space).
Reactor&prototype&built&and&
operated&in&facility&similar&to&
commercial&application.&&No&
simulated&conditions.&&Reactor&
runs&at&varying&loads&
continuously&for&determined&test&
period
No&action&needed&
for&technology,&
Analysis&of&
installation&siting&
choices&and&
military&impacts&on&
NRC&licensing
Reactor&prototype&facility&
coupled&to&process&heat&
application.&Verification&of&all&
outputs&(power&and&process&
heat)&at&varying&loads.
8
Actual&system&completed&
and&qualified&through&
test&and&demonstration.
Technology&has&been&proven&to&work&in&
its&final&form&and&under&expected&
conditions.&In&almost&all&cases,&this&TRL&
represents&the&end&of&true&system&
development.&Examples&include&
developmental&test&and&evaluation&
(DT&E)&of&the&system&in&its&intended&
weapon&system&to&deterSmine&if&it&meets&
design&specifications.
NRC&validation&and&design&
certification&complete
DoD,&Army&Corps&
of&Engineers&and&
NRC&analysis&and&
validation&of&
impacts&on&license&
for&military&
application.&
NRC&licensing&of&cogeneration&
design&and&process&heat&
application&license
9
Actual&system&proven&
through&successful&
mission&operations.
Actual&application&of&the&technology&in&
its&final&form&and&under&mission&
conditions,&such&as&those&encountered&in&
operational&test&and&evaluation&(OT&E).&
Examples&include&using&the&system&under&
operational&mission&conditions.
Successful&build&and&operation&of&
Clinch&River&Project
mPower&facility&
installed&on&pilot&
installation.&
Validation&of&
systems,&protocols,&
management&and&
operation
Successful&build&and&operation&of&
military&installation&CHP&facility.&
Incorporation&of&process&heat&
produced&for&installation&use
DoD2Technology2Readiness2Levels
Complete2
2
Complete2
2
Complete2
2
Complete2
2
Complete2
2
Complete2
2
Complete2
2
Complete2
2
Complete2
2
Complete2
2
Complete2
2
Past2Analysis2Review/
Update2
2
Past2Analysis2Review/
Update2
2
InJProgress2
2
InJProgress2
InJProgress2
2
InJProgress2
2
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